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CHAPTER 4: RELATIVIST ACCOUNTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THEORY 
CHOICE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
Relativism and realism are rival views of science.  The history of relativism is as old as 
that of realism, both of which having their root in the Ancient Greek philosophy.  
Relativism, according to the historian of philosophy, can be traced back to the time of the 
Sophists.  Protagoras, one of the greatest Sophists in the fifth century BC, who claimed 
that man is the measure of all things has set the basic principle for the relativism ever 
since—“there are two arguments on every subject” (Guthrie 1977, 24).  According to 
Guthrie, a great historian of Ancient Greek philosophy, Protagoras’s ‘man-measure’ 
claim is a form of “an extreme subjectivism according to which there was no reality 
behind and independent of appearances,…, and we are each the judge of our own 
impressions.” (Guthrie 1977, 186).  The criteria of knowledge, according to Protagoras 
and Greek Sophists, are relative to each man.  It is conceivable that the criteria of theory 
choice, according to the Sophists’ tenets, indeed lie in the subjectivity of the agents who 
adjudicate between rival scientific theories.  As every man is the measure of things, there 
would be no objective and standardized criteria for theory choice.  All conceivable 
criteria would be on an epistemic par.     
 
 
Skepticism is always connected to relativism in one of the two ways: either (1) from 
skepticism to relativism or (2) from relativism to skepticism.  The (1) is exhibited by 
those who doubt the existence of reality or the knowability of the reality, and go further 
to maintain that any theory that accounts for the reality is no matter of fact.  This group of 
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skeptics-relativists views scientific theory as a tool rather than emphasizing the 
dimension of objectivity/truth of a theory.  The (2) is demonstrated by those who hold 
that the merits of scientific theory are framework-based.  This group of relativists rejects 
the notion that there exists fundamental scientific theory across scientific communities 
and historical epochs.  There is a danger to glide into skepticism when these relativists 
draw a conclusion that the reality cannot be disclosed neutrally (objectively) by any 
scientific theory.  Notably, not many relativists are radical skeptics about reality and 
scientific theories.  For radical skepticism can hardly be a consistent doctrine.  It is 
always found self-refuting in the radical version of skepticism. 
 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the doctrine of relativism and its connection to the problem 
of theory choice.  I discuss Nelson Goodman’s relativism at length in Section 4.2.  His 
notions of world, world-versions, and world-making are elaborated in connection to the 
problem of theory choice.  Section 4.3 is allocated for the discussion of Kuhn’s relativism, 
with the emphasis on his notion of paradigm.  The issues of theory choice are discussed 
in connection to different phases of science.  The relation between incommensurability 
and theory choice is also discussed.  Finally, Feyerabend’s relativist position is elaborated 
in Section 4.4.   
 
 
4.2 Goodman’s Conception of World and World-versions 
 
 
Goodman is a nominalist who espouses individuals (particulars) over classes (universals) 
(Eberle 2009, 451).  In the classical debate between realists and nominalists since the 
middle age, these two camps converge on the point that substances are real.  However, 
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they disagree on the ontological status of properties.  Realists hold that properties are real, 
which are universals in the sense that multiple instance of properties is possible 
(Campbell 2009, 606).  Nominalists, however, claim that properties are not real, “being 
mere shadows cast by resemblance, or language, or habits of classification” (Campbell 
2009, 606).   
 
 
Goodman’s nominalism adheres to the basic tenet of classical nominalism, and 
transcends to accept individuals of any kind, both of tangible and abstract (Eberle 2009, 
451).  Tangible and abstract individuals are real, according to Goodman, because they are 
conceptually human-made.  This marks a difference between Goodman and other 
nominalists who maintain that individuals are naturally real.  For Goodman, the world is 
made up of various individuals that can be conceived of, be it concrete or abstract, natural 
or manufactured.  Such fabrication is done by human’s mind.  For Goodman, world 
cannot exist independently without cognitive activities (Nolt 2004, 71).  World 
encompasses not only natural things and artificial things, such as mountain and chair.  
The Goodmanian world also comprises of abstract things such as numbers, fiction, arts 
and music.  Unlike other philosopher such as Lewis who takes world as a function of 
propositions to truth-values (Berto 2010, 471), Goodman’s does not take this semantic 
approach to account for the ontology of world.    
 
 
However, Goodman does not hold that the everyday world, be it natural or artificial, is 
the ultimate reality.  He views the everyday world in terms of a multiplicity of different 
worlds.  A poet lives in the world of poetry, whereas a scientist lives in the world of 
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science.  Goodman stresses that he is by no means a modal realist who embraces the 
existence of possible worlds when he speaks of an array of multiple worlds.  All worlds 
are actual worlds (Goodman 1978, 94).  These actual worlds are not multiple alternatives 
reducible to a single actual world. 
  
We are not speaking in terms of multiple possible alternatives to a single actual 
world but of multiple actual worlds. 
        (Goodman 1978, 2)  
      
 
The world is made, not found (Goodman 1978, 22).  It is noteworthy that Goodman does 
not account for the way to individualize the abstract individuals that constitute the world.  
Goodman concerns what can be made of abstract individuals rather than what are the 
basic constituents of them (Elgin 2009, 290) and what way to differentiate between them.  
Although Goodman does not make explicit what he means by abstract individuals, we 
can rightly assume that symbols, triangles, and musical notations that have been 
enumerated by him in Ways of Worldmaking, are examples of abstract individuals.  
Goodman’s recognition of abstract individuals as real particulars in our residing world 
marks a divergence from the standard metaphysical claim that abstract individuals are 
mere possible that exist only in the possible world (Heller 2007, 78).  This departure from 
the standard view of abstract individuals is also shared by Kripke in the context of the 
existence of fictional entities, where the latter are “in some sense” abstract entities that 
exist in our concrete world (Thomasson 2009, 14-15).  The difference between Goodman 
and Kripke is that the latter claims that fictional entities are abstract entities existing 
contingently in a concrete activity of writing or story telling (Thomasson 2009, 15), while 
the former does not explicitly attribute existential contingency to abstract individuals.  
  
182 
However, Goodman implicitly implies that abstract individuals can be expressed only 
through tangible medium, such as sounds, pictures, and words.  The example given is the 
abstract paintings that have no subject which “may still refer by exemplification or 
expression” (Goodman 1978, 105).  All of the abstract individuals lie within the actual 
world where human reside (Goodman 1978, 104).   
 
Fiction, then, whether written or painted or acted, applies truly neither to nothing 
nor to diaphanous possible worlds but, albeit metaphorically, to actual worlds. 
       (Goodman 1978, 104) 
 
 
Goodman’s concept of abstract individuals is not purely formal objects as numbers are.  
It shares the characteristics of “earthy abstracta” proposed by Peter Simons, which 
implies that the ontological difference between abstract individuals is the difference of 
materiality in connection to their relevant concrete domain (such as music and art works) 
in the actual world (Simons 2003, 491-492). That is to say, abstract individuals can be 
instantiated as concrete individuals.  For both Goodman and Peter Simons, the difference 
between abstract individuals can be identified in their different ways of concrete 
instantiation (e.g. Beethoven’s third symphony and fifth symphony can be differentiated 
when they have been instantiated by musicians, viz., being performed in a concert).  
Interpreting Goodman’s concept of abstract individuals with this “earthy” flavor (i.e. 
abstract individuals can be instantiated as concrete individuals) may save him from being 
accused as a self-contradictory nominalist, for abstract individuals are universal 
substances that embraced by realists. 
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According to Goodman, saying that individuals and worlds are made is not amounting to 
holding that (i) they are mere artifacts without natural existence; (ii) one can create 
individuals and worlds in any arbitrary way.  Goodman does not say that an individual, 
for instance, a mountain is human-made, in such a way that the individual (eg. Mountain) 
that fits into the world is fabricated.  Worlds are made “by making versions” (Goodman 
1978, 94).  It is the versions that are made prior to any scientific activity and 
consequently determine the worlds one resides.  Hence, Goodman has placed an 
emphasis on the conceptual context of the worlds—versions—rather than the entities in 
the worlds.  The versions are abstract individuals in the Goodmanian sense; whereas the 
entities in the worlds, which are the contents of the versions, are the instantiated concrete 
individuals.  This interpretation of versions-contents relation is inline with Goodman’s 
nominalism.  In fact, the contents are dependent on the versions not only ontologically, 
but their meanings are also determined by the versions.  The contents of the versions are 
causally connected to the contents of the worlds.  It can be concluded that when 
Goodman uses the term “worldmaking”, he implies “version-making”, or “world-version 
making” to be more specific.  We may reasonably question how it is possible for 
Goodman’s world-version not to be a concept of class (universal), which is supposed to 
be rejected if he is a serious nominalist.  However, Goodman seems taking this issue 
lightly by treating anything, perhaps including the concept of world-version, as an 
individual.  Goodman’s strategy is to reduce all substances, be it concrete or abstract, to 
“physical particles or phenomenal elements” (Goodman 1978, 95).  However, such 
strategy is not successful in defending the universal-like concept of world-versions as a 
consistent nominalist tenet, because world-versions are not substances (that is, it cannot 
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be localized in time and space).  Goodman is aware of this plight as he declares that he 
does not impose nominalistic restrictions in his exposition of worldmaking (Goodman 
1978, 95).  
 
I am sometimes asked how my relativism can be reconciled with my nominalism.  
The answer is easy.  Although a nominalistic system speaks only of individuals, 
banning all talk of classes, it may take anything whatever as an individual. [my 
emphasis] 
        (Goodman 1978, 94) 
 
Nominalism of itself thus authorizes an abundance of alternative versions based 
on physical particles or phenomenal elements or ordinary things or whatever else 
one is willing to take as individuals. 
        (Goodman 1978, 95) 
 
 
Worlds are fabricated in a way that conforms to the versions, which are the frame of 
reference.  Version as a form has world as its content.  Such form and content are bound 
to form the world-version, which is a frame of reference fabricated by human before any 
intellectual activity can be carried out.  However, world-versions are not arbitrarily made.  
The fabricated worlds are “actual words made by and answering to true or right 
versions.” (Goodman 1978, 94)  True or right versions are made based on the entities in 
our residing world, such as “physical particles or phenomenal elements” (Goodman 1978, 
95).  Goodman proceeds further to claim that right versions may also be based on 
“whatever else one is willing to take as individuals” in the version-making (Goodman 
1978, 95).  This implies that although Goodman holds that his acceptance of countless 
right world-versions “does not mean that everything goes” (Goodman 1978, 94), his 
willingness to allow any individual things to be used as the constituents of world-versions 
is still amounting to radical relativism.  Granting that anything can be the constituents of 
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world-versions, Goodman claims that worldmaking may culminate in different world-
versions.  
 
This does not mean….that worlds are built from scratch.  We start, on any 
occasion, with some old version or world that we have on hand and that we are 
stuck with until we have the determination and skill to remake it into a new one… 
Worldmaking begins with one version and ends with another.  
        (Goodman 1978, 97) 
 
The uniformity of nature we marvel at or the unreliability we protest belongs to a 
world of our own making. 
        (Goodman 1978, 10) 
 
 
Goodmanian world-version rejects the notion of an ultimate reality and a single 
interpretation of the world.  Instead, the Goodmanian world-version allows a pluralistic 
way of interpreting the world and its constituents.  Goodman rejects the reduction of 
pluralistic world-versions to a single world (Goodman 1978, 4).  Pluralistic world-
versions, which are independent from one another, have independent importance and thus 
irreducible to the world-version of physics (Goodman 1978, 4-5).  Notably, multiple 
world-versions are not always homologous.  They are permissible to be in conflict.    
 
The pluralists’ acceptance of versions other than physics implies no relaxation of 
rigor but a recognition that standards different from yet no less exacting than 
those applied in science are appropriate for appraising what is conveyed in 
perceptual or pictorial or literary versions. 
       (Goodman 1978, 5) 
 
In one world there may be many kinds serving different purposes; but conflicting 
purposes may take for irreconcilable accents and contrasting worlds… Grue 
cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would 
preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference. 
       (Goodman 1978, 11) 
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The irreducibility of pluralistic world-versions to a single fundamental world-version 
identifies Goodman as a relativist.  The irreducibility of pluralistic world-versions implies 
that there are no unique truth and objective reality, where this absence of uniqueness is 
the core doctrine of relativism (Gellner 1982, 183).  For Goodman, reductionist approach 
is impossible because it undermines the diverse-yet-integrated world-versions that one 
possesses.  In a relativist’s account, world-versions are conceptual schemes, which are 
sets of fundamental beliefs about the world (Baghramian 2004, 165).  The reductionist 
approach that undermines the organic world-versions will thus cast partiality in one’s 
world-version. 
 
To demand full and sole reducibility to physics or any other one version is to 
forego nearly all other versions. 
         (Goodman 1978, 5) 
 
 
World-version is taken by Goodman as a function of how worlds are made, with the 
individuals in the worlds assuming the role of variables.  By dissolving individuals into 
the function of world-version, Goodman has abstained from answering the problem of 
individualization of abstract individuals that he claims exist. 
 
With false hope of a firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds 
that are but versions, with substance dissolved into function…… we face the 
questions how worlds are made, tested, and known. 
        (Goodman 1978, 7) 
 
 
Goodman constructs a theory of pluralistic world-versions by dissolving substance 
(individual) into function.  World-version as function implies conceptual frameworks and 
properties.  As a nominalist, Goodman is not supposed to endorse the existence of 
properties.  Instead, Goodman’s endorsement of pluralistic world-versions also implies an 
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implicit endorsement of the multiplicity of properties, which is a metaphysical realist 
doctrine of the existence of universals.  According to metaphysical realist, universal as a 
shared entity encompasses the properties of individuals and the kind to which they belong 
(Loux 2006).  The conception of world-version which presupposes a multiplicity of 
properties has allowed metaphysical realism to sneak into Goodman’s nominalist thought. 
 
Talk of unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum 
without properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, conceptualizes, 
ascribes properties.  
       (Goodman 1978, 6) 
 
Predicates, pictures, other labels, schemata, survive want of application, but 
content vanishes without form. 
       (Goodman 1978, 6) 
 
 
Content consists of individuals or substances.  It is this content, which is also known as 
fact, that constitutes the world.  In the post-linguistic turn in the analytic tradition, facts 
are truth-bearers that have no independent existence in the world (Hossack 2007, 32).  
However, Goodman’s conception of facts is departing from this traditional standard 
interpretation, for he speaks of physical and perceptual facts that are independent of 
language.      
 
 
Although “facts constitute the one and only real world” (Goodman 1978, 91), many facts 
that fit the past may diverge in the future, as stated by Goodman (Nozick 1993, 123).  
The belief in the divergence of past facts into different future facts thus reasonably 
accounts for the existence of multiple worlds and multiple world-versions.  For Goodman, 
worlds are made from other worlds (Goodman 1978, 6).     
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The many stuffs—matter, energy, waves, phenomena—that worlds are made of 
are made along with the worlds.  But made from what?  Not from nothing, after 
all, but from other worlds.  
        (Goodman 1978, 6) 
 
 
The existence of multiple worlds and world-versions can also be accounted from the 
perspective of culture and society.  Men live in different society who inherited different 
cultural background see things differently.  Furthermore, “worlds may differ in that not 
everything belonging to one belongs to the other” (Goodman 1978, 8).  Cultural or 
societal impact on the multiplicity of worlds and world-versions is an unavoidable 
practical need (Goodman 1978, 9).  Though Goodman does not say much about the actual 
constructional process of worldmaking, Hacking insists that Goodman’s constructivist 
conception of worldmaking ought to be interpreted as a social process because it is 
people who make the world (Hacking 1999, 45).  Recently, Boghossian has identified this 
constructivist approach as “constructivism about facts” which states that “all facts are 
socially constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests.” 
(Boghossian 2008, 377) 
 
Eskimo who has not grasped the comprehensive concept of snow differs not only 
from the world of the Samoan but also from the world of the New Englander who 
has not grasped the Eskimo’s distinctions. 
        (Goodman 1978, 9) 
 
Since the constructions in question are socially contingent, it looks as though one 
society may construct the fact that p even while another one constructs the fact 
that not-p.  But it couldn’t be the case both that p and not-p. 
        (Boghossian 2008, 378) 
 
 
Goodman points out that “we make worlds by making versions” (Goodman 1978, 94).  
Worlds are constructed through the lens of world-versions.  Without the latter, one cannot 
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perceive and know the former.  One may rebut by giving an example, making an analogy 
between worlds and buildings, and between world-versions and blueprints, that building 
can be perceived or known without a blueprint.  It is true to say so, to a certain extent, 
that one does not need to have a detailed blueprint in mind prior to perceiving a building, 
but it is not true to claim that one needs not to possess the idea of what constitutes a 
building. Such idea, which is the Goodmanian world-version, defines the nature of a 
building. Without a world-version of police station, one may not be able to differentiate 
between police station and other buildings (say, a hospital).  More seriously, without 
world-version, one cannot live a normal life because he is unable to perceive something 
as something.  To illustrate, a cat on the street may perceive the building of a police 
station; yet this animal is unable to perceive that building as a police station because it 
does not have a Goodmanian world-version.   
 
Facts are the contents of world-versions, which is relative from one world to another.  
Goodman repudiates that there are absolute and objective facts.  Instead, facts are 
abundant and varied in the world.  Therefore, the world can be perceived in various ways 
by different perceivers.  However, Goodman permits the similarity of facts and world-
versions (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 106) in order to dampen down the occurrence of 
exclusively inconsistent and conflict worlds.  Facts are translatable into each other 
because most of them are either similar or not exclusively incommensurable.  If the facts 
are mutually translatable into each other, they are commensurable varieties of the same 
fact. 
 
  
190 
The chapter before began with the rather reproachful question “Can’t you see 
what’s before you?”, and arrived at the illuminating answer “That depends…”…. 
one thing it depends on heavily is the answer to still another question: “What do 
you make of it?” 
        (Goodman 1978, 91) 
 
Did the sun set a while ago or did the earth rise? Does the sun go around the earth 
or the earth go around the sun? Nowadays, we nonchalantly deal with what was 
once a life-and-death issue by saying that the answer depends on the 
framework….the geocentric and the heliocentric versions, while speaking of the 
same particular objects—the sun, moon, and planets—attribute very different 
motions to these objects.  Still, we may say the two versions deal with the same 
facts if we mean by this that they not only speak of the same objects but are also 
routinely translatable each into the other. 
        (Goodman 1978, 93) 
 
 
 
Goodman’s conception of world-version is a contextualist approach.  Two scientists may 
make observation with different world-versions, reaching at different theories, while 
working with the same facts of the same world.  Chappell has distinguished two types of 
contextualist, namely of semantic and of inferential (Chappell 2008, 532).  Semantic 
contextualists hold that the meanings of epistemic words such as ‘know’ vary across 
contexts; while inferential contextualists hold that the epistemic problem varies across 
contexts primarily due to the variation in the constitution of contexts (Chappell 2008, 
532).  Goodman is apparently an inferential contextualist, for he holds that multiple 
worlds—as the constitution of world-versions— exist.  Goodman argues that both 
geocentric and heliocentric world-versions are right versions based on their own context 
of argument.  He reaches an extreme conclusion that one may adopt any world-version 
and theory as one deems fit to suit her purposes. 
 
In practice, of course, we draw the line wherever we like, and change it as often 
as suits our purpose.  On the level of theory, we flit back and forth between 
extremes as blithely as a physicist between particle and field theories. 
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        (Goodman 1978, 119) 
 
 
As a contextualist who holds that there are multiple right world-versions that exist 
legitimately, Goodman inclines to embrace content relativism.  According to Cappelen, 
content relativism states that interpretation of content/fact varies across interpreters 
(Cappelen 2008).  An observed fact may be interpreted differently by two scientists who 
are working with different world-versions.  A physicist may interpret the term “time” in 
the context of Newtonian linear framework while his colleague may interpret the same 
term in the context of Einsteinian spatial-temporal framework.  Following Goodman’s 
train of thought, a scientist may switch between different world-versions, but he cannot 
hold multiple conflicting world-versions simultaneously about the same fact.  It is 
because the same fact should exist in the same world, and conflicting world-versions 
imply the conflict between different worlds (Goodman 1978, 116).  A particular 
investigated fact is not permissible to exist in two different possible worlds (but it is 
permissible to exist in different actual worlds, such as world of science and arts), for 
Goodman rejects the existence of possible worlds.  When confronted with the plight of 
world-version choice, the scientist will go through a process called reflective equilibrium, 
which is a process of adjustment to achieve a stable coherence among different 
judgements (Goodman 1953; cited Kelly 2005).  Hence, at least at the high level, choice 
among competing world-versions is possible by using the method of reflective 
equilibrium—which is a concept introduced in Goodman’s Fact, Fiction, and Forecast 
(surprisingly, it was disappeared in the later Ways of Worldmaking).  Reflective 
equilibrium is a method that operates contextually (Kelly 2005, 185), which is perfectly 
apt to be applied as a strategy to choose among an array of rival world-versions.  
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However, Goodman provides no clue to implementing reflective equilibrium when one is 
confronted with conflicting world-versions about the same fact. 
 
 
4.2.1 Ways of World-making 
 
 
Goodman elaborates at length five ways of world-making.  Although world-making is a 
process that discards the fundamentalist conception of truth, one should not deliberately 
ignore the place of truth in world-making.  The general notion of truth is sometimes a 
required but insufficient standard in the process of world-making.  Furthermore, truth is 
relative to the worlds. 
 
Insofar as a version is verbal and consists of statements, truth may be relevant.  
But truth cannot be defined or tested by agreement with ‘the world’; for not only 
do truths differ for different worlds but the nature of agreement between a version 
and a world apart from it is notoriously nebulous. 
        (Goodman 1978, 17) 
 
  
The nebulous nature of agreement between a world-version and its relevant world allows 
flexibility in the way of world-making.  Such obscurity is the immediate result of the 
absence of an ultimate truth.  There is no ultimate standard in making a world.  Hence, a 
multiplicity of worlds can co-exist legitimately. 
 
 
Although Goodman allows the multiplicity of worlds to be fabricated, he stresses the 
importance of creating right versions of worlds.  ‘Right version’ does not mean ‘true 
version’.  For Goodman, a right version of world means an apt version that suits the 
purpose of world-making.  For example, the world with the version of molecules is not 
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the apt world for the everyday world (Goodman 1978, 21), yet it is relevant only to the 
physicist world.  
 
That right versions and actual worlds are many does not obliterate the distinction 
between right and wrong versions, does not recognize merely possible worlds 
answering to wrong versions, and does not imply that all right alternatives are 
equally good for every or indeed for any purpose. 
        (Goodman 1978, 20-21) 
 
 
Thus, when speaking of ways of world-making, Goodman emphasizes on the ways of 
making right version of world for the right purpose.  The rightness is a relative standard 
which does not preclude conflicting world-versions. 
 
The dramatically contrasting versions of the world can of course be relativized: 
each is right under a given system—for a given science, a given artist, or a given 
perceiver and situation. 
        (Goodman 1978, 3) 
 
 
A right world-version is important because it determines the rightness of the world.  
Goodman holds that there is no foundation for us to arbitrate the rightness of a world 
without the lens of a right world-version.  However, there is no objective way to arbitrate 
the rightness of a world-version.  The only standard for rightness is a pragmatic one—
fitting the purpose of the person who lives in that world. 
 
Yet doesn’t a right version differ from a wrong one just in applying to the world, 
so that rightness itself depends upon and implies a world?  We might better say 
that ‘the world’ depends upon rightness.  We cannot test a version by comparing 
it with a world undescribed, undepicted, unperceived….. While we may speak of 
determining what versions are right as ‘learning about the world’, ‘the world’ 
supposedly being that which all right versions describe, all we learn about the 
world is contained in right versions of it.   
       (Goodman 1978, 3-4) 
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Goodman’s treatment of the notion of world and world-version inherits much of the 
continental philosophical style, which can hardly be analyzable to a specific referent.  He 
claims that there are five indispensable ways of world-making.  Firstly, world can be 
made by “composition and decomposition” (Goodman 1978, 7-10).  It is an approach that 
requires one to assemble and dismantle facts.  A distinction between part and whole 
needs to be drawn in the first place.  In orthodox account, part-whole relation is applied 
to any kind of objects (Uzquiano 2006, 137), being physical or abstract, observable or 
unobservable.  Goodman raises no argument against this orthodox view.  On the one hand, 
connection between parts should be identified in order to recognize the whole; On the 
other hand, identifying features of the part is the way to decomposing the whole.  Both 
composition and decomposition requires identification of the relationship between facts.  
It is made possible “by the application of labels: names, predicates, gestures, pictures, 
etc.” (Goodman 1978, 7-8)  Goodman’s suggestion of using proper name for the labels in 
composing and decomposing the world is consistent with his nominalism.   
 
 
World can be made by composing and decomposing.  However, Goodman holds that not 
every single composing or decomposing activity is tantamount to creating a brand new 
world.  This may prevent the existence of an infinite number of worlds.  What Goodman 
expects is the construction of right worlds, not numerous worlds which do not serve the 
purpose of their creator. 
 
We do not make a new world every time we take things apart or put them together 
in another way. 
        (Goodman 1978, 8) 
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Goodman treats pictures and predicates equally important in the process of world-making.  
Along with gestures and names, they are labels that one can use to compose and 
decompose the world.  These labels denote the facts uniquely (Goodman 1978, 102) 
when they are decomposed; while denote generally when they are composed.  
 
Thus pictures may make and present facts and participate in worldmaking in 
much the same way as do terms.  
        (Goodman 1978, 8) 
 
 
The right world that is constructed with the aid of any labels—predicates, gestures, 
pictures, etc—has a salient feature of consistency.  There is consistency if one’s world 
exhibits regularity. 
 
Only so, for example, do our observations of emeralds exhibit any regularity and 
confirm that all emeralds are green rather than that all are grue…  The uniformity 
of nature we marvel at or the unreliability we protest belongs to a world of our 
own making. 
        (Goodman 1978, 10) 
 
 
Thus, consistency is a measure that determines if the right world is made by the ways of 
composing and decomposing.  It is apparent that two scientists may hold rival yet 
consistent (at least, partially) theories.  According to Goodman’s way of world-making, 
both rival theories are right (Goodman avoids using the term ‘true’) and worth pursuing 
as long as internal consistency can be achieved by each of them.   
 
 …. worlds differ in the relevant kinds they comprise. 
        (Goodman 1978, 10) 
 
 
So, the world of scientist A differs from that of scientist B in the sense that they 
subscribes to different theories.  Rival theories are different in the sense that they have 
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different theoretical contents.  However, they are relevant in the sense that both are 
relevant to the same facts.  Hence, rival theories are relatively right (Goodman foregoes 
the term ‘true’) theories if they are internally consistent and relevant to the facts.  Theory 
consistency and fact relevancy are the criteria of theory choice. 
 
 
The second way of world-making proposed by Goodman is a process called weighting.  It 
is a process of placing the emphasis differently in world-making.  Certain facts are 
emphasized more than others, for they are more relevant for the intended world. 
 
While we may say that in the cases discussed some relevant kinds of one world 
are missing from another, we might perhaps better say that the two worlds contain 
just the same classes sorted differently into relevant and irrelevant kinds. 
        (Goodman 1978, 10) 
 
  
Weighting is also a process of changing interests and developing new insights (Goodman 
1978, 11).  New insights can always be obtained when there is a shift in interest.  
Consequently, a new world is made from the old one.  The difference between geocentric 
and heliocentric views is the difference of emphasis rather than the difference in entities.  
Both views are right from their own perspective. 
 
Some relevant kinds of the one world, rather than being absent from the other, are 
present as irrelevant kinds; some differences among worlds are not so much in 
entities comprised as in emphasis or accent, and these differences are no less 
consequential. 
        (Goodman 1978, 11) 
  
 
With changing interests and new insights, the visual weighting of features of bulk 
or line or stance or light alters, and yesterday’s level world seems strangely 
perverted—yesterday’s realistic calendar landscape becomes a repulsive 
caricature. 
        (Goodman 1978, 11) 
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Goodman enumerates the histories of Renaissance as another example:  
 
one that, without excluding the battles, stresses the arts; and another that, without 
excluding the arts, stresses the battles.  This difference in style is a difference in 
weighting that gives us two different Renaissance worlds.  
(Goodman 1978, 101-102) 
 
 
These different Renaissance worlds are different in world-versions yet converging on the 
same facts.  Both historical accounts of the Renaissance admit the facts of the battles and 
the arts.  However, they assign different weightage to these facts, by so doing the worlds 
of Renaissance are created in different ways.  The Renaissance world of arts places 
heavier weight on the aspect of arts, while largely ignoring the war affairs.  The 
Renaissance world of battle places heavier weight on the aspect of war affairs, while 
ignoring the achievement of arts.  Due to this difference in weighting, the world-versions 
of historians vary.  It is possible that the theories about Renaissance are contradictory 
among historians who hold different world-versions.  However, these conflicting theories 
are right theories if they describe the facts that do exist in the Renaissance time.  
Goodman may think that the conflicting theories, which are the conflicting world-
versions, are the right theories as they are the versions of the world on which they 
converge.  Following Goodman’s line of thought, a historian is free to construct any 
theory about the past by using weighting approach on the facts.  Theory choice does not 
appear as a problem as long as the choice is to be made based on the relevant world.  
 
 
Ordering is the third way of world-making.  Far before his publication of Ways of 
Worldmaking in 1978, Goodman has recognized the significance of ordering as an 
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opportunity for cognitive advancement in his 1954’s masterpiece Fact, Fiction, and 
Forecast (Elgin 2000, 13).  Ordering is a process where men apply a frame of reference 
on a set of same entities.  An entity can be ordered in different way by different persons 
in their perception and cognition.  Different orderings inevitably result in different world-
versions.  There is no issue of primitive or derivative world-version generated from 
ordering.  The apparent effect is the different constructional systems of the world.  They 
“differ in order of derivation” (Goodman 1978, 12) from the same entity of the world. 
 
 
Ordering as a way of world-making is somehow radical.  Goodman denotes radical 
ordering as a way of reconstructing the world-version that is unbounded by a primitive 
guideline.  According to Goodman, there is no absolute guideline of ordering in 
perceptive and cognitive activity.  Goodman uses the construction of a comprehensive 
image of a city as an example of radical ordering (Goodman 1978, 13).  The information 
about the city is temporally, spatially, and qualitatively heterogeneous.  There exists no 
single guideline of ordering to reconstructing the comprehensive information of a city.  
Different ordering of city reconstruction will yield different image of the city.  Besides, 
radical ordering is also exemplified in the map reading (Goodman 1978, 13).  Different 
spatial order in reading a map results in different temporal sequence of a trip.  
 
 
Although radical ordering is unbounded by any specific guideline, it is not carried out 
without any guideline at all.  At the minimal, ordering is made possible provided that it 
adheres to the “suitable arrangements and groupings” (Goodman 1978, 13), that is, the 
ordering must be confined to the nature of the ordered entities in the world.  A typical 
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example can be found in map reading, an activity in which the ordering of a route is 
confined by the spatial order.  The route can be reasonably constructed in any order as 
long as the ordering is carried out in terms of the spatial order (left, right, south, and etc).  
Non-spatial order in map reading for street direction, such as the order of brightness of 
the color on the map, is an instance of wrong ordering.  For it is not a conventional way 
to use the color brightness as a guide to search for the street direction.  A legitimate 
ordering activity consists of the choice of the right order type, based on the nature of the 
ordered entity.  As such, travelers are deemed rational in choosing any spatial order in 
map reading.  They are irrational if their choice of route is based on the non-spatial order, 
such as the order of brightness.    
 
 
The fourth way of world-making is deletion and supplementation.  It is an approach of 
modification that applied on the created world.  It is to be adopted to suit the purpose of a 
world-maker by polishing the created world in his desired form. 
 
….the making of one world out of another usually involves some extensive 
weeding out and filling—actual excision of some old and supply of some new 
material. 
        (Goodman 1978, 14) 
 
 
Goodman contends that deletion and supplementation are common in everyday life, art 
works and scientific practices (Goodman 1978, 14-15).  This approach is carried out 
subconsciously in everyday life and deliberately in the scientific practice.  One tends to 
dismiss what he has perceived as illusory or negligible if it does not fit into his world-
version (Goodman 1978, 15).  Scientists, on the other hand, tend to deliberately reject or 
purify the entities and events of the world in order to conform to his world-version 
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(Goodman 1978, 15).  Nonetheless, deletion and supplementation as ways of world-
making must conform to the coherence of world-version. 
 
 
Deletion and supplementation imply choice which must be cohered with the existing 
world-version.  Goodman illustrates the replacement of analog system by digital system 
as an example of deletion.  He argues that the use of digital thermometer with readings in 
tenths of a degree is a deletion of the temperature readings that lie between 90 and 90.1 
degrees (Goodman 1978, 15).  As for the case of supplementation, Goodman states that 
experiment has shown that observers creatively perceive two spots of light as moving 
along a path when they are flashed in quick succession (Goodman 1978, 15-16).  The 
perceived phenomenon of moving light is a supplementation to the perceived flash of 
light at two distant spots. 
 
 
The fifth, and the last, way of world-making is deformation.  Deformation is defined as 
correction or distortion of the constructed world-version (Goodman 1978, 16).  
Deformation is adopted by scientists in re-adjusting the curve of a graph in order to fit the 
data (Goodman 1978, 16).  This approach of world-making is similar to the approach of 
deletion and supplementation.  It is carried out pragmatically to perfect the constructed 
world-version. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Problem of Theory Choice in Goodman’s Relativism 
 
 
Apparently, Goodman’s constructivism is a version of contextualism.  The context of 
world-making involves perception, cognition and social factors.  Hence, it is impossible 
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to create an objective world-version which is faithfully corresponding to the reality-as-it-
is.  Indeed, such objective world-version is repudiated by Goodman in his stance of anti-
fundamentalism.  Firstly, Goodman holds that there is no single fundamental reality and 
fact as they are diverse in multitude.  Goodman rejects the idea that there is an ultimate 
reality in which all other facts supervene on it.  Secondly, Goodman holds that all facts 
that constitute world-version are fabricated.  Although the fabrication of world-version 
follows five general ways as outlined in Section 4.2.1, Goodman denies that two persons 
may always obtain the identical world-version using the same facts as the material for 
construction. 
 
 
The rejection of a single objective world-version does not lead Goodman to deny the 
existence of a mind-independent reality.  The non-existence of an ultimate reality implies 
that the constituents of reality exist on the same par in terms of ontology, where conflict 
of worlds is inevitable.  A multiplicity of possibly conflicting world-versions created with 
different purposes is also permitted.  A wrong world-version should not be chosen, 
according to Goodman, from the rival world-versions.  Although the wrong world-
versions are unfavorable, right yet conflicting world-versions are permitted. 
 
Under “rightness” I include, along with truth, standards of acceptability that 
sometimes supplement or even compete with truth where it applies… 
            (Goodman 1978, 109-110) 
 
 
Goodman does not worry about the flowering of competing right world-versions.  As a 
pluralist, he holds that “conflicting versions often present good and equal claims to truth” 
(Goodman 1978, 110).  At the semantic level, conflicting world-versions render the 
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respective statements in a state of conflict.  Conflicting statements about two conflicting 
world-versions cannot be both true.  One possible solution is to permit the conflicting 
statements to be true in different possible worlds.   
 
We can hardly take conflicting statements as true in the same world without 
admitting all statements whatsoever (since all follow from any contradiction) as 
true in the same world, and that world itself as impossible.  Thus we must either 
reject one of two ostensibly conflicting versions as false, or take them as true in 
different worlds… 
        (Goodman 1978, 110) 
 
 
An advocate of possible worlds does not face problem in choosing among conflicting 
world-versions.  For, she may contend that these conflicting world-versions reflect a 
clash in the world we inhabit, but they are true and non-conflict if they reflect multiple 
possible worlds which are different from our actual world.  She may follow David Lewis 
in holding that such possible worlds are no less actual than the world we inhabit, for “the 
inhabitants of other worlds may truly call their own worlds actual” (Lewis 2001, 161), 
and importantly, ‘actual’ is indexical (Lewis 2001, 161).  Each possible world consists of 
one world-version, and an alternative world-version implies the existence of another 
possible world.  Thus, the problem of choice of world-versions does not arise for the 
advocate of possible world because there is only one world-version in each possible 
world.  Since Goodman repudiates the theory of possible world, two conflicting 
statements are not to be taken as true in different possible worlds. 
 
 
Goodman’s rejection of the theory of possible world is a metaphysical rather than a 
semantic stance, that is, he denies the existence of the worlds which are different from the 
one we inhabit.  In spite of such metaphysical rejection, Goodman is a proponent of 
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epistemic possible worlds—though he does not make explicit of it.  The theory of 
epistemic possible worlds dictates the varied epistemic possibilities of one’s knowledge 
about the world.  A statement or theory may bear different epistemic meanings in 
different epistemic context—that is, a theory can manifest many distinct epistemic 
possible worlds.  Notably, an advocate of the epistemic possible worlds does not need to 
be a modal realist who holds fast to the existence of metaphysical possible worlds. 
 
In addition to metaphysical possibilities—ways the world might have been—there 
are also epistemic possibilities—ways the world might be, for all we know.  For 
example, it is now widely accepted that however things might have been, water 
would still be H2O: that is, it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O.  
However, for all people in the eighteenth century knew, water was not H2O:  that 
is, it was epistemically possible that water was not H2O. 
        (Whittle 2009, 265) 
   
 
In the epistemic context of the eighteenth century, the progress of science was not up to 
the level to enabling scientists to recognize water as H2O.  According to the theorists of 
epistemic possible worlds, the claim that “water is not H2O” is legitimate in the epistemic 
context of the eighteenth century.  Water could be possibly and legitimately recognized 
as a compound of anything which is other than the chemical bonding between Hydrogen 
and Oxygen atoms.  Advocates of epistemic possible worlds can be divided into two 
groups: one holds that the notion of epistemic possibility is subject-relative; another holds 
that this notion is subject-independent (Whittle 2009, 269).  The former group is typical 
relativists who claim that there is no consensus about the truth of a proposition or theory, 
for the epistemic possible worlds are relative to subject.  For example, in the eighteenth 
century, scientist A may hold that water is a compound P while scientist B may assert that 
water is a compound Q, where P and Q are not H2O.  According to the relativist of 
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epistemic possible worlds, both claims are legitimate.  The proponents of rival theories 
do not necessarily share a common belief.  Choice between rival theories can be made 
arbitrarily in the epistemic context of the eighteenth century.  On the contrary, the 
advocates of subject-independent notion of epistemic possibility are non-relativists who 
hold that there is a common belief among different people on a proposition or theory 
(Whittle 2009, 269).  Choice between rival theories is thus constrained by the shared 
belief. 
 
 
Goodman belongs to the camp of relativist of epistemic possible worlds.  Two apparently 
conflicting propositions can be both true in their respective epistemic possible worlds.  
He asserts that sometimes propositions appear to be in conflict because they are elliptical 
(Goodman 1978, 111).  The conflict can be resolved if the propositions are expanded by 
the addition of more details.    
 
Statements affirming that all soldiers are equipped with bows and arrows and that 
none are so equipped are both true—for soldiers of different eras; the statements 
that the Parthenon is intact and that it is ruined are both true—for different 
temporal parts of the building; and the statement that the apple is white and that it 
is red are both true—for different spatial parts of the apple. 
        (Goodman 1978, 111) 
 
 
Goodman thinks that it is epistemically possible that two conflicting propositions 
describing the same object are both true.  Proposition P1 “Parthenon is intact” and 
proposition P2 “Parthenon is ruined” appear contradictory.  It is so because they are 
elliptical, held Goodman.  The conflict is resolved when a temporal perspective is 
introduced.  Temporal perspective is part of world-version.  By adding the temporal 
details to these conflicting propositions, the original elliptical propositions are expanded, 
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and become different in meaning.  P1 can be expanded to a new proposition P1’ 
“Parthenon is intact at the time of Socrates”; while P2 can be expanded to P2’ 
“Parthenon is ruined in 2010”.  The expanded proposition P1’ and P2’ resolve the 
conflict between P1 and P2.   
 
 
According to Goodman, choice between conflicting propositions or world-versions is 
impossible, as in the case of P1 and P2.  It is because these elliptical propositions cannot 
be both true in our residing world.  For theory choice to be possible, the original 
propositions or world-versions have to be expanded by adding more details.  Such 
addition implies the adoption of additional perspective (i.e. of temporal, spatial etc)—that 
is, additional world-versions.  Multiple perspectives can be added to the original 
propositions or world-versions, as Goodman holds that one world is always made from 
other worlds, and world-making is a remaking (Goodman 1978, 6).  However, Goodman 
has recognized that this solution is an ad hoc approach, because the expanded 
propositions always carry different meaning from the original one.  The expanded 
propositions “speak of different things or different parts of things” (Goodman 1978, 111).  
Furthermore, triviality of proposition or world-version is introduced in Goodman’s 
solution.  The original P1 and P2 may be expanded into infinitely many true proposition 
P1n and P2n, rendering the choice trivial too.  It is because Goodman confers all right 
proposition/world-version an equal epistemic status.   
 
 
The choice between two propositions/theories shall be made within the respective world-
version.  It is illustrated explicitly by Goodman in his example of the motion of the earth. 
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 On the face of it, the two statements 
 
(1) The earth always stands still 
(2) The earth dances the role of Petrouchka 
 
conflict since the negate of each follows from the other.  And they seem to be 
about the same earth.  Yet each is true—within an appropriate system. 
        (Goodman 1978, 111) 
 
 
Goodman claims that statement (1) and (2) are elliptical and thus can be “expanded by 
explicit relativization” (Goodman 1978, 112) within the respective world-version.  
Goodman expands (1) and (2) into (3) and (4), respectively, as below: 
 
(3) In the Ptolemaic system, the earth stands always still 
(4) In a certain Stravinsky-Fokine-like system, the earth dances the role of 
Petrouchka. 
(Goodman 1978, 112) 
 
 
The new proposition (3) and (4) mean differently from (1) and (2), because the addition 
of extra details to the former has altered the original meaning of the latter.  The 
proposition (3) and (4) do not tell us if the earth actually moves.  What they claim is that 
the answer to the question of motion/motionless of earth depends on a particular world-
version/perspective (either Ptolemaic or Stravinsky-Fokine-like system).  Without these 
added world-version, choice between (1) and (2) does not have a rational ground.  It is 
because (1) and (2) are conflicting, and the fact that both propositions are epistemically 
possible makes them possess equal epistemic status. 
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The choice is possible within a particular world-version.  Taking the world-version of 
Ptolemaic system as illustrated in proposition (3), suppose that two scientists arrive at 
two conflicting propositions: 
  
 (3a)  In the Ptolemaic system, the sun moves. 
 (3b)  In the Ptolemaic system, the sun stands still. 
 
 
It is apparent that proposition (3a) and (3b) are derived from (3), and they are subsumed 
under the same world-version—the Ptolemaic system.  Using Goodman’s terminology, 
(3a) and (3b) “fit” to the Ptolemaic world-version.  Rational choice between (3a) and (3b) 
is possible within the Ptolemaic world-version, because the same world-version is used as 
the background for choice.  Hence, one can reasonably conclude that, within the world-
version of the Ptolemaic system, proposition (3a) is true while (3b) is false.  It is because 
(3a) is consistent with the geocentric doctrine of the Ptolemaic system.  Hence, (3a) is 
more favorable to be chosen over (3b) in the world-version of the Ptolemaic system. 
 
 
According to Goodman, world-versions are distinct.  They can be either conflicting or 
non-conflicting.  Notwithstanding for the case of non-conflicting world-versions, they 
may not necessarily manifest the overlapping content.  Using Kuhn’s term, distinct 
world-versions may appear to be incommensurable.  Hence, it is impossible to make a 
meaningful point-to-point comparison between two world-versions.  It is because such 
comparison requires one to take a perspective—a higher world-version, without which 
the comparison cannot be carried out.  When a higher world-version is adopted as a 
perspective for comparison, issue of the distinctiveness of this higher world-version 
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raises in the same way as faced by those world-versions under comparison.  The higher 
world-version, which serves as a framework for specific comparison between two world-
versions, does not warrant the plausibility of point-to-point comparison.  Furthermore, 
meaningful comparison between distinctive world-versions is hampered by the infinite 
recursive steps to higher world-version.  Since Goodman has repudiated the conception 
of ultimate reality and world-version, there is no absolute world-version for one to adopt 
as a final frame of reference in choosing between two world-versions.    
 
 
In a nutshell, Goodman’s conception of world-versions renders him in a difficult state to 
answer to the problem of theory choice, where two rival theories are derived from 
different world-versions.  In Goodman’s philosophy, rational theory choice is only 
possible provided that the rival theories are derived from within the same world-version.  
Goodman does not think that the rightness of a theory is vindicated by the corresponding 
reality.  On the contrary, he claims that “total and permanent acceptability [of a theory], 
though, may be taken as a sufficient condition of rightness” (Goodman 1978, 139).  The 
criteria of theory acceptability are relativistic, for it is a matter of fit to the world-version 
(Goodman 1978, 138).     
 
 
4.3 Kuhn’s Conception of Paradigm and the Problem of Theory Choice  
 
 
4.3.1  Theory Choice in the Transition from Immature Science to Mature Science 
 
 
The problem of theory choice in Kuhn’s philosophy is closely related to his conception of 
paradigm.  Paradigm is a putative vague notion used in many contexts by Kuhn.  
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According to Masterman, this term was used in at least twenty one different ways by 
Kuhn, in a somewhat quasi-poetic style (Masterman 1970, 61).  In the broadest sense, it 
is a framework that characterizes the development of science.  It has been used to 
distinguish different discrete stages of a discipline.  Each discrete stage is characterized 
by a set of governing beliefs, theories, and standard practices.   
 
…the term ‘paradigm’ is used in two different senses.  On the one hand, it stands 
for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the 
members of a given community.  On the other, it denotes one sort of element in 
that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or 
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining 
puzzles of normal science. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 175) 
 
 
Kuhn holds that the first sense of ‘paradigm’ is sociological in nature (Kuhn 1970, 175).  
It is a communal consensus achieved by the scientists who are working within the same 
paradigm.  The notion of paradigm as a social framework has been exploited by 
sociologists of science to account for the scientific activities and outcomes from the 
perspective of social interaction.  The ambiguity of the notion of paradigm is also 
attributed to its application in scientific activities at the micro-level, that is, the impacts of 
paradigm-governed psychological state of individual scientist in scientific activity. 
 
 
The second sense of ‘paradigm’ is more ambiguous and elicited plenty of criticisms.  Its 
meaning is always associated with the introduction of subjectivity and irrationality into 
science (Kuhn 1970, 175).  The second meaning of ‘paradigm’ denotes the function of 
paradigm, that is, as a guide for scientific quests.  Paradigm as a research guide is 
grounded in the social environment—based on the definition of Kuhn—which is shaped 
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by shared beliefs and values.  Paradigm as a value-bound research guide provides the 
legitimate problem-solution for the practitioners in their subsequent research.  Hence, 
paradigm has always been interpreted as a relativist concept, for the underlying shared 
values and beliefs are relative with different scientific communities.  A scientist from a 
different community who has no social bond with a competing paradigm will face the 
problem in understanding and accepting it (Demir 2008, 140-142). 
 
 
Kuhn has divided scientific development into three stages: immature science, normal 
science, and revolutionary science.  However, there is a cycle between the period of 
normal science and revolutionary science.  Such cycle is driven by accumulated 
anomalies that lead to crises, which induce scientific revolution.  Science resumes to the 
state of normal science after scientific revolution, and the cycle goes on. 
 
 
Paradigm is a marker that distinguishes three stages of science.  The stage of immature 
science is characterized by the absence of paradigm.  In this period, a divergence of 
beliefs, theories, practices, and methods prevail.  There is no consensus of the standard 
problem-solution set.  A wide variety of choices in pre-scientific activity emerges in the 
practitioners’ community.  These choices of theory and method are carried out without 
the guidance of paradigm, thereby the outcomes can possibly be contradictory.  
Interestingly, Feyerabend was in disagreement with Kuhn about the non-existence of 
paradigm during the period of immature science.  Feyerabend, in a letter to Kuhn, 
maintained that paradigm “existed long before modern science” (Hoyningen-Huene 2006, 
617).  Such divergence between Feyerabend and Kuhn lies in the different understanding 
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of paradigm.  For Feyerabend, paradigm is being understood as ways of thinking or 
methods.  It is unnecessarily scientific in nature.  Nevertheless, Kuhn takes paradigm to 
be scientific which denotes methods, laboratory protocols, theories, laws and scientific 
beliefs.    
 
 
However, Kuhn does not regard immature science as an enterprise that is always 
consisted of unscientific elements.  For Kuhn, the determinant of being scientific is not 
the outcome of a prediction.  That is, a realized prediction that fits well with the reality is 
not the only criterion of being scientific.  He claims that not all sciences are predictive, 
nor are experimental (Kuhn 1983, 568).  The determinant of being scientific is far more 
than accurate prediction, involving also the complexity of skill, sensitivity to minor errors, 
and the precision of the input for prediction (Kuhn 1970a, 8).   
 
 
Kuhn distinguishes between precision as a goal and precision as an achievement.  A 
research that pursues precision as its goal is not unscientific notwithstanding that it fails 
to achieve precision as the outcome (achievement).  The example given by Kuhn to 
support his claims is the study of astrology, which is regarded as an immature science.  
Although astrologers failed to predict precisely, astrology was an enterprise that pursues 
precision as a goal in its endeavors.  It is in this sense Kuhn holds that astrology is not 
mere unscientific.     
 
Astrology cannot be barred from the sciences because of the form in which its 
predictions were cast.  Nor can it be barred because of the way its practitioners 
explained failure.  Astrologers pointed out…… the forecast of an individual’s 
future was an immensely complex task, demanding the utmost skill, and 
extremely sensitive to minor errors in relevant data.  The configuration of the stars 
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and eight planets was constantly changing; the astronomical tables used to 
compute the configuration at an individual’s birth were notoriously imperfect; few 
men knew the instant of their birth with the requisite precision.  No wonder, then, 
that forecasts often failed. 
        (Kuhn 1970a, 8)   
 
 
Kuhn holds that astrology is a discipline that strives for the accurate prediction (precision 
as a goal).  The failure of astrologers in obtaining accurate predicted outcome (precision 
as an achievement) was held accountable not by the astrology itself, but accountable by 
the complex variables of prediction (i.e. “few men knew the instant of their birth with the 
requisite precision”).  Hence, Kuhn asserts that astrology is not a sheer unscientific 
discipline.  The goal of astrology to pursue accuracy is a scientific element.   
 
 
Although astrology, as an immature science, is not totally unscientific in its research 
activity, it is “not a science” (Kuhn 1970a, 8).  Astrology is a craft that resembles 
engineering, meteorology, and medicine (Kuhn 1970a, 8).  Despite the fact that 
astrologers had rules to apply in their practice, “they had no puzzles to solve and 
therefore no science to practice” (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  Apparently, Kuhn thinks that it is not 
the imprecision of astrology that makes it an immature science.  Astrology is not a mature 
science because it has no puzzles.  
 
 
Immature science is not always necessarily leading to normal science, although Kuhn 
holds that normal science must derive from immature science.  The route to normal 
science is affected by societal-value-bound rational choices which may lead to the 
emergence of first paradigm that governs normal science.  Normal science is a mature 
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science, which is not only striving for precision as a goal, but it is also based on the past 
achieved precision about the studied phenomena (precision as an achievement): 
 
[its] research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, 
achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time 
as supplying the foundation for its further practice. 
         (Kuhn 1970, 10) 
 
 
Based on Kuhn’s distinction between precision as a goal and precision as an achievement, 
it is clear that immature science is always characterized by pursuing precision as its goal 
but fails to realize it as an achievement; normal science, on the contrary, must pursue 
precision as its goal and achieve it eventually.  This is evident in Kuhn’s claim that 
normal science is “based upon one or more past scientific achievements” (Kuhn 1970, 
10).  On the grounds of past achievements, normal science proceeds to make more 
achievements. 
 
 
Mature science is also characterized by the existence of routine problems and problem-
solving activity (Nickles 2003, 144).  In immature science, the problem-solving activity 
is different from that of mature science in the sense that the choices made (choice of 
theory, methods, belief and etc) by different practitioners are not converging to a 
consensus.  In other words, the real problem-solving activity is not deemed to exist in 
immature science because there is disagreement about what constitutes a problem.  Thus, 
the linear model of problem-solving activity, that is, one solution leads to another 
problem, does not exist in immature science.  Linear model of problem-solving activity is 
important in mature science as it drives the development of science.  The absence of such 
model makes the accumulative progress of immature science to mature science 
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impossible, as there is no direction for such progress to take place due to the 
disagreement about the nature of problem.   
 
 
As problem-solving activity is an indication of the existence of consensus in a particular 
discipline, that is, the characteristic of normal science, the absence of consensus is the 
salient feature of immature science.  Kuhn has conceived of this idea even before the 
publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolution.  In The Essential Tension, which 
was published three years ahead (in 1959) of The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Kuhn 
called the phase of immature science as “preconsensus phase” and the phase of normal 
science as “firm consensus phase” (Kuhn 1959; cited in Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 133).  It 
is apparent that the maturity of a scientific discipline is depending on the communal 
consensus, which is the social factor.  In The Structure of Scientific Revolution and his 
1963 article The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research, Kuhn also used “preparadigm 
period” and “paradigm period” to denote “preconsensus phase/immature science” and 
“firm consensus phase/normal science” (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 133).  Thus, 
notwithstanding the ambiguity of the concept of paradigm, a paradigm-governed normal 
science is always characterized with the existence of communal consensus of problem-
solving activity.  A paradigm defines the legitimate problem-solution in normal science.  
 
 
The consensus of problem-solution must fulfill two requirements to maintain the 
paradigm and normal science.  Firstly, the achievement derived from such consensus 
must be “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from 
competing modes of scientific activity” (Kuhn 1970, 10).  Secondly, the problem-solution 
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set must be “sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group 
of practitioners to resolve.” (Kuhn 1970, 10).  The first requirement implies two things.  
First, the scientific achievement derived from practitioners who are working under a 
background consensus on a standard problem-solution should be sufficiently 
extraordinary, which is always made possible by the emancipation of scientific practice 
from traditional dogmas, subsequently allowing novel ideas to emerge.  This implies that, 
for novel ideas to emerge abundantly, the problem-solution as a research guide should not 
be too specific and restrictive.  Problem-solution is expected to sketch the research 
direction in a broad rather than in a specific way.  A problem-solution that assumes a role 
as a specific guide to every single detail will restrain the creativity of scientists and thus 
deter the subsequent achievements, which in turn losing its attractiveness to the adherents.  
A scientist is more likely to be committed to a paradigm which is unrestrictive and tends 
to lead to significant new discoveries.  The commitment of adherents to a paradigm is 
important for a normal science to sustain.  Second, the standard problem-solution should 
be far more robust than the competing problem-solution in order to keep its adherents 
away from the competing paradigm.   
 
 
The second requirement implies that the openness of problem-solution allows sufficiently 
wide horizon for subsequent theory applications and development.  In normal science, 
practitioners “force nature into the conceptual boxes” (Kuhn 1970, 5) with their creativity 
that bound by the paradigm.  In the case where there is insufficient openness of a guiding 
problem-solution, the effectiveness of problem-solving will be affected.  The abundance 
of hurdles might be encountered as the consequence.  The nature of openness of problem-
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solution characterizes normal science with the paradigm-bound element of arbitrariness 
(Kuhn 1970, 5) and subjectiveness (Kuhn 1970, 156). 
 
 
Paradigm is maintained by the faith of its advocates.  In the transition from immature to 
mature science, scientists must have a faith that the first “paradigm will succeed with the 
many large problems that confront it” (Kuhn 1970, 158).  The initial faith in the first 
paradigm is derived from the recognized problem-solving ability demonstrated in the 
paradigm that drives transition from immature science to mature science.  It is a rational 
faith—a faith that can be reasoned by the problem-solving ability of paradigm.  It is this 
rational faith demonstrated in the cumulative nature of normal science research, which 
distinguishes it from the period of immature science. 
 
Normal research, which is cumulative, owes its success to the ability of scientists 
regularly to select problems that can be solved with conceptual and instrumental 
techniques close to those already in existence. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 96) 
 
 
The rational faith of practitioners and the emergence of problem-solution distinguish 
mature science from immature science.  The practitioners in the immature science do not 
have a rational faith because there is no problem-solution.  The faith of practitioners in 
any given theory in immature science is thus irrational, for the theory that they subscribed 
to does not have a paradigmatic problem-solution.  Hence, theory choice of practitioners 
in immature science is irrational and groundless from the viewpoint of a scientist who is 
working in the normal science.  No practitioner can legitimately proclaim that his theory 
is privileged over the rivals, for there is no paradigm to legitimate the choice.  
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Furthermore, the absence of paradigm also implies the impossibility of theory 
comparison in the immature science.      
 
 
The faith of practitioners in mature science implies loyalty to a single paradigm.  
According to Feyerabend, Kuhn denies the possibility of psychological commitment to 
more than one paradigm (Hoyningen-Huene 1995, 356).  Hence, in Kuhn’s opinion, the 
faith in a single-paradigm marks the completion of transition from immature science to 
mature science.   Both faith and problem-solution drive the cumulative growth of normal 
science within a paradigm.  The choice of the first paradigm in the immature 
science/mature science transition period is somehow arbitrarily dependent on the faith 
and the communal consensus on problem-solution set.  
 
 
4.3.1.1  Theory Choice in the Period of Immature Science 
 
 
In the period of immature science, there is no paradigm that determines the problem-
solution, methodology, and research direction.  Strictly speaking, it is impossible to have 
a scientific theory in the period of immature science, for paradigms, which are absent, are 
deemed to exist prior to theory (Masterman 1970, 66).  A theory cannot exist without a 
paradigm.  The absence of a theory, in the light of paradigm, is not the absence of any 
theory per se but the non-existence of a paradigm-governed theory.  As pointed out by 
Bird, the absence of a paradigm-governed theory implies that each researcher will have to 
start from scratch in his research (Bird 2000, 30).  There might have numerous existing 
theories but there exists no single governing theory.  It is in this sense when Kuhn asserts 
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that paradigm, as a concrete scientific achievement, is prior to the various theories (Kuhn 
1970, 11).    
 
 
In spite of this, theory choice can still be found in immature science.  However, theory in 
immature science is not the Kuhnian paradigm-governed systematic theory, but a trivial 
one.  A trivial theory is not necessarily an insignificant theory.  It is a theory that is 
irrelevant to any paradigm, that is, a paradigmless theory.  It does not have problem-
solution.  In Kuhn’s word, immature science does not have puzzle to solve.   
 
 
Theory in immature science is defined loosely, which denotes an unsystematic thought on 
a phenomenon.  It is more akin to speculative opinion or thought fragment.  Sometimes 
Kuhn refers to this kind of theory as “speculative and unarticulated theories” (Kuhn 1970, 
61).  The example of the theory in immature science is the theory of basic substance in 
ancient Greece.  Thales, the founder of ancient Greek philosophy, holds that the basic 
constituent of all things is water; Anaximenes, another ancient Greek philosopher, thinks 
that it is air that constitutes the things.  Apparently, the water theory and the air theory are 
different theory, regardless of the fact that they are not being considered as a scientific 
theory in modern science.  The fluid theory of electricity is another example of immature 
science theory given by Kuhn.  The adherents of this theory believed that electricity is 
fluid because they experienced a severe shock when touching the conductor-connected 
water (Kuhn 1970, 61-62).      
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In his reply to critics in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Kuhn coined a new term 
“proto-sciences” to denote immature sciences whose theories and practices resemble 
“philosophy and the arts rather than the established sciences in their development 
patterns” (Kuhn 1970b, 244).  Clearly, proto-sciences are immature sciences in the 
context of the development patterns which are characterized by the lack of clear-cut 
progress.  The examples given by Kuhn include chemistry and electricity theory before 
the mid-eighteenth century, and today’s social sciences. 
 
 
Kuhnian conception of progress cannot be construed in terms of the truth.  Rather, it must 
be understood in terms of puzzle-solving.  According to Alexander Bird, Kuhnian 
conception of progress is a functional approach because a scientific progress is measured 
by the success in fulfilling the problem-solving function (Bird 2007, 67).  The success of 
problem-solving is an evidence of scientific progress.  The magnitude of success thus 
constitutes Kuhnian conception of “clear-cut” progress.   
 
 
A progress is achieved where a new paradigm is more capable in terms of problem-
solving compared to its predecessors.  The progress takes a zigs and zags course rather 
than a linear accumulation of knowledge (Scheffler 2000, 164).  In proto-sciences, the 
absence of paradigm and puzzle-solving imply the impossibility of clear-cut progress.  
Hence, the progress from proto-science to mature science is not warranted. 
 
I claim no therapy to assist the transformation of a proto-science to a science, nor 
do I suppose that anything of the sort is to be had. 
       (Kuhn 1970b, 245)     
 
 
  
220 
There seems to be contradictory when Kuhn claims that proto-sciences lack a clear-cut 
progress on one hand, while admitting that some proto-sciences may advance into a state 
of normal science on the other hand.  This seeming contradiction is dismissed by a 
careful interpretation of Kuhn’s statement where he claims that proto-sciences have no 
clear-cut progress.  It is apparent that the absence of clear-cut progress in proto-sciences 
does not imply the absence of any progress.  Progress is still possible in Kuhnian proto-
sciences, as it is evidenced by the fact that some proto-sciences have progressed into 
mature sciences.  Hoyningen-Huene points out that Kuhnian progress is marked by “an 
increase in articulation and specialization” (Hoyningen-Huene 1998, 4).  Progress in 
proto-sciences, interpreted as such, is not a form of progress in terms of puzzle-solving.  
Unfortunately, Kuhn did not provide further elaboration. 
 
 
However, there are some clues we may pick up.  In immature science, progress can be 
seen as driven by individual rather than by community.  It is because the non-existent of 
paradigm in this period signifies the lack of collective forces (shared agreement, protocol, 
apprenticeship, problem-solution, etc) on individual practitioners.  The variation of each 
individual on theory choice is enormous, for there is no shared agreement on the criteria 
(i.e. lack of a paradigm).  However, the absence of a paradigm alone is insufficient to 
account for the maturity of a discipline.  In addition to the establishment of a paradigm, it 
is a necessary requirement that the paradigm is not too dogmatic to restrict the ideas of its 
practitioners.  For Kuhn thinks that a paradigm should grant, to certain extent, its 
practitioners freedom in their research to make progress.  In comparison with the 
immature science, Kuhn recognizes that the (paradigm-permitted) variability of judgment 
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in theory choice is essential to scientific advance in the normal science (Kuhn 1970b, 
262).  By the same token, the same must hold in the immature science, for otherwise 
there is no way to account for the transition of some immature sciences (e.g. fluid theory 
of electricity) to normal science (e.g. modern theory of electricity).  
 
 
Theory choice in the period of immature science is characterized by the lack of consensus 
among the researchers about what constitutes the phenomena under study.  This 
disagreement places a rather loose definition of theory choice, in which the legitimacy of 
a choice is not an agreed matter.  In fact, the legitimacy of theory choice is not an 
important issue in immature science.  A practitioner may claim that criterion c1 should be 
adopted as a legitimate criterion in theory choice, whereas another practitioner may have 
another criterion, say c2, for a legitimate theory choice.  No party can persuasively 
convince their opponents about the superiority of their criteria for theory choice, since a 
paradigm does not exist in the period of immature science. 
 
 
Thus, criterion of theory choice in immature science is not bound by any agreed standard.  
However, the non-existent of any agreed theory choice criteria does not imply the 
absence of any criteria.  These criteria are non-objective due to the lack of a paradigm, 
that is, they are not universally acceptable by the community.  However, these non-
objective criteria of theory choice might be rational if a practitioner bases his theory 
evaluation on the today’s agreed virtues of science, such as accuracy, coherence, 
generality, and so on.  These criteria are the good reasons (rational) for theory choice in 
the normal science (Kuhn 1970b, 261; Kuhn 1983, 568).  An astrologer is rational if his 
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choice of theory T over the rival T’ is based on the reason that T is more accurate, or 
more general, and so on.  The criterion of theory choice is pluralistic, as there are no 
universal criteria of theory choice.         
 
 
Though the criteria of theory choice might be rational in the immature science, Kuhn 
does not claim that it actually will.  In fact, he does not elaborate on the criteria of theory 
choice in the immature science.  To him it seems that the criteria are not a matter, for the 
theories are no matter in this period of science.  
 
 
However, in his article Reflections on My Critics, Kuhn was seemingly against the 
position that there exist any rational criteria of theory choice in the immature science.  He 
asserts that “if they [scientists of mature science] did not hold values [accuracy, scope, 
simplicity, etc] like these, their disciplines would develop very differently” (Kuhn 1970b, 
261-262).  Kuhn implies that rational criteria of choice are required for the mature 
science to exist.  Since the immature science is very different from the mature science, it 
is reasonable to infer that Kuhn does not think that there are any rational criteria of theory 
choice in the immature science.  Furthermore, it is also reasonable to claim that the non-
existence of rational criteria of theory choice contributes to the non-existence of 
paradigm in the immature science.      
 
 
4.3.1.2  Theory Choice in the Immature-Mature Science Transition 
 
 
Contrary to many philosophers, Kuhnian mature science is not definable in terms of 
predictive and experimental activities (Kuhn 1983, 568).  Nor the terms and languages of 
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a field can be used to define a science (Kuhn 1983, 568).  For Kuhn, there is no simple 
definition about science.  He sometimes says that whether an activity is science “need not 
have an answer” (Kuhn 1983, 568).  However, Kuhn admits that it is possible to 
distinguish mature science from non-science.  Kuhnian science is necessarily 
characterized by the possession of a paradigm (Stone 1991, 179).  The immature-mature 
science transition is a process of paradigm acquisition.       
 
 
The transition from immature science to mature science requires three criteria: (1) The 
emergence of puzzles (Kuhn 1970a, 5); (2) the abandonment of Popperian critical 
discourse (Kuhn 1970a, 6); (3) and the abandonment of Popperian scientific testing 
(Mayo 1996, 271).  These criteria will be discussed in this section.  It is noteworthy that 
these three criteria are interdependent.  However, Kuhn holds that puzzle is more 
fundamental to the emergence of science (Kuhn 1970a, 7).     
 
 
Kuhnian puzzles do not amount to any problem that arises in a discipline.  A field-
oriented problem does not necessarily characterize a puzzle.  Astrology, which is not a 
science, has plenty of problems (such as the configuration of the stars) but no puzzle, 
according to Kuhn (Kuhn 1970a, 8).  Hence, Kuhnian puzzles are narrower in the 
meaning.  Puzzle is not field-oriented but paradigm-oriented.  A puzzle in physics is 
identified so not in virtue of it being a problem about physical phenomena, but in virtue 
of it being paradigm-oriented (e.g., wave theory or particle theory of light).  A puzzle is 
relevant to paradigm in the sense that it can be conceptualized and operational in the 
framework of paradigm. 
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A paradigm can…. .even insulate the community from those socially important 
problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated 
in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies. 
             (Kuhn 1970, 37) 
 
 
The nature of the puzzles that marks the successful immature-mature science transition is 
best illustrated by Kuhn in his comparison between astronomy and astrology.  Astronomy 
as a mature science constitutes “calculational and instrumental puzzles” (Kuhn 1970a, 9). 
 
For more than a millennium these were the theoretical and mathematical puzzles 
around which, together with their instrumental counterparts, the astronomical 
research tradition was constituted. 
           (Kuhn 1970a, 9) 
 
  
The puzzles of astronomy arise from the past failures.  The failures encountered by 
astrologer, by contrast, did not give rise to puzzles (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  It is so for the 
astrology because “there were too many possible sources of difficulty” (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  
Kuhn holds that the persistent failures encountered in astrology are due to the difficulty in 
the application of the theory by the astrologer to explain and predict the astronomical 
phenomena (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  The non-mathematical nature of astrological theories is the 
main factor contributing to the failure in the explanation and prediction of the 
astronomical phenomena.  Besides, astrologers were facing difficulties in providing a 
coherent set of astrological theories.  It is not the incompetence of the astrologer, as many 
of them, such as Kepler and Ptolemy, were astronomers too (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  The failure 
of astrology to transit to mature science has its cause in the discipline itself.  The nature 
of astrology, unlike astronomy, is doomed to fail in acquiring a first paradigm.  
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For a successful immature-mature science transition to take place, it is essential that the 
particular discipline is capable of supporting a puzzle-solving tradition.  Such tradition 
allows the practitioners to constructively revise the discipline when facing with 
difficulties and failures (Kuhn 1970a, 6).  To make a transition successful, a discipline 
must provide resources to overcome the failures.  By overcoming the failures, new 
problems emerge that lead the practitioners to refine their techniques, tools and theories.  
The more failure is surmounted, the better chances a discipline can support the puzzle-
solving tradition.  Astrology failed to transit to a mature science because it was haunted 
by the same fundamental failures for centuries.  No improvement had been made to 
overcoming these failures.  The stagnant state of astrology results in no further new 
problems in the field.  Hence, the fact that astrology is not able to support a puzzle-
solving tradition leads it no where to a state of mature science. 
 
 
Besides, a successful immature-mature science transition requires a wide range of 
possible solutions to the failure.  The solutions can take the form of alternative 
calculations, theories, or instruments.  The more alternative to the solution is available, 
the more likely a problem can be solved.  Take astronomy as an example.  Kuhn contends 
that astronomy has more resources to handle a failure than astrology does.  An 
astronomer can adjust his theory, make a new measurement, or reform his astronomical 
technique (Kuhn 1970a, 9).  On the contrary, astrology did not have a variety of solution 
to the failure.  Astrologer could not make use of the failures “in a constructive attempt to 
revise the astrological tradition.” (Kuhn 1970a, 9)       
 
 
  
226 
The emergence of a puzzle-solving tradition, as a requirement of a successful immature-
mature science transition, implicitly allows a “quasi-revolution” to happen.  In fact, Kuhn 
does not think that revolution happens in any period of science except in revolutionary 
science.  He has never explicitly claimed that a revolution is required for the formation of 
a mature science.  However, the requirement of a puzzle-solving tradition in mature 
science somehow demonstrates that such tradition must occur out of sudden.  It is so 
because Kuhn asserts that there is only problem but no puzzle exists in the period of 
immature science.  For the first puzzle to emerge, which is the first sign of the emergence 
of mature science, it is reasonable to conceive of a quasi-revolution that facilitates such 
transition.  A quasi-revolution is a revolution that encompasses revolutionary 
breakthrough in the choice of theory, in the advent of new instrument, and in 
methodology used.  Consequently, problems evolve into puzzles in a way that the 
territory of the discipline continuously expanded and enriched with more puzzles that 
drive the discipline forward to a mature state.   
 
 
The quasi-revolution that drives the immature-mature science transition is not a full-
fledge revolution as what happens during the replacement of paradigms in the 
revolutionary science period.  However, it is akin to the paradigmatic revolution in the 
sense that the change of world view is ensued.  Practitioners start seeing nature in a new 
way.  By such a gestalt switch of world view, practitioners working in the immature 
science apply new theories, instruments, and methods in their attempts to surmount the 
fundamental failure.  The criteria of theory choice in this stage are largely irrational, for a 
rational criterion requires some maturity of the discipline to serve as a basis for a choice 
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to be made.  It is dubious that the practitioners in an immature science could arrive at a 
rational agreement about what elements constitute such basis for theory choice.  Indeed, 
Kuhn contends that any reasonable agreement among practitioners is more likely to occur 
in the mature science (Kuhn 1982).    
 
 
In addition, quasi-revolution shares two characteristics with scientific revolution.  First, 
in quasi-revolution and scientific revolution, a paradigm gains its status because it is 
more successful than its rivals in tackling the critical problems.  Second, both quasi- and 
scientific revolution provide a paradigm that promises a good prospect for future research.  
Scientists believe that this promise of success is realizable in normal science.  Wide 
spread confidence in a new paradigm among the members of a scientific community may 
drive a quasi-revolution in the formation of the first puzzle in normal science; and drive a 
scientific revolution in the formation of the new paradigm-puzzle in the period of 
revolutionary science.    
 
Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their 
competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to 
recognize as acute…..The success of a paradigm…..is at the start largely a 
promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 23-24)     
 
 
The quasi-revolution in immature science may or may not lead to the successful 
transition to mature science.  It is a necessary but insufficient condition for this transition.  
If the fundamental failure in the immature science has been overcome, a new horizon 
may open and the first puzzle would emerge.  The solution to the first puzzle leads to new 
puzzles, in which a new solution awaits.  The puzzle-solution cycle continues, which is a 
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sign of the formation of puzzle-solving tradition, and eventually the transition from 
immature science to mature science is realized.  
 
 
Once the puzzle has emerged, a “common body of belief” (Kuhn 1970, 13) is established.  
The shared puzzle is important in the immature-mature science transition, for it serves as 
a foundation for the accumulation of scientific knowledge.  The practitioner is free in 
building “his field anew from its foundations” (Kuhn 1970, 13) in the immature science, 
but he is restricted to a common body of accumulated knowledge in the mature science.      
 
 
What is the role played by theory choice in immature-mature science transition?  In the 
immature science, theory choice is “relatively free” (Kuhn 1970, 13) in the sense that it is 
not governed by a paradigm.  Theory choice in the immature science is not a choice 
between competing paradigms, for paradigm has not emerged.  However, given that a 
quasi-revolution is reasonably posited to drive immature-mature science transition, it is 
apt to consider the emergence of a quasi-paradigm during such transition.  It is a 
reasonable consideration, for Kuhn explicitly admits that a new paradigm often emerged 
ahead of the crisis in normal science.   
 
Often a new paradigm emerges, at least in embryo, before a crisis has developed 
far or been explicitly recognized. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 86) 
 
 
Thus, a quasi-paradigm may well explain the existence of theories in the immature 
science.  Without a paradigm, or a quasi-paradigm, Kuhn has difficulty to account for the 
theory choice in immature science.  Without theory choice justified in the period of 
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immature science, it is inconceivable that a transition from immature science to mature 
science could take place.   
 
 
Kuhn does not elaborate much on the role of theory choice in the immature-mature 
science transition.  By assuming the legitimacy of quasi-paradigm in immature science, 
we may as well assume that the practitioners have been facing multiple quasi-paradigms 
for them to choose from to overcoming the encountered problems in the field.  A correct 
theory choice is essential for the first puzzle to emerge.  However, theory choice takes no 
full responsibility on the immature-mature science transition, for a successful transition is 
primarily dependent on the nature of the internal difficulty of the discipline itself.  It need 
not be rational, for the standard-governing paradigm has yet to emerge.    
 
 
Apart from the emergence of puzzle, the abandonment of Popperian critical discourse 
(Kuhn 1970a, 6) constitutes the second criterion for immature-mature science transition.  
Kuhn’s understanding of critical discourse is “the tradition of claims, counter-claims, and 
debates over fundamentals” (Kuhn 1970a, 6).  For Popper, critical discourse consists of 
bold conjectures and criticism (Popper 1970, 55).  Kuhn agrees with Popper that critical 
discourse, whose origin can be traced back to Greek philosophy, is a part of science 
(Kuhn 1970a, 6).  However, Kuhn does not grant that critical discourse is all of science 
(Kuhn 1970a, 6).  Saying of critical discourse being a part of science, Kuhn means that it 
“recurs only at moments of crisis” (Kuhn 1970a, 6), when scientists “must choose 
between competing theories” (Kuhn 1970a, 7).  In other periods of science, critical 
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discourse does not occur.  It is the abandonment of critical discourse in favor of puzzle-
solving that “marks the transition to a science” (Kuhn 1970a, 6) 
 
Already by the Hellenistic period mathematics, astronomy, statics and the 
geometric parts of optics had abandoned this mode of [critical] discourse in 
favour of puzzle solving.  Other sciences, in increasing numbers, have undergone 
the same transition since.  In a sense, to turn Sir Karl’s view on its head, it is 
precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a 
science. 
        (Kuhn 1970a, 6) 
 
     
Interestingly, the fact that Kuhn asserts that critical discourse occurs only at moments of 
crisis when scientists must choose between rival theories implies two things.  First, Kuhn 
does not think that theory choice genuinely occurs in other periods of science except in 
the period of crisis.  Second, Kuhn implicitly concedes that theory choice is not rational 
(which is quite opposite to his later view on the rationality of theory choice), for he 
contends that critical discourse (which is rational according to Popper) needs to be 
abandoned for the sake of practicing normal science.  The reason of abandoning critical 
discourse perhaps, according to Kuhn’s line of thought, lies in the view that it would 
impede the development of science.  It is fair to hold that any factor that would impede 
the development of science is an irrational factor.  In view of the fact that critical 
discourse in normal science is accompanied with deciding between fundamental theories, 
and given that critical discourse is irrational if it has been practiced in normal science, we 
may conclude that Kuhn would concede that theory choice (of fundamental theories) is 
irrational in normal science.     
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Lastly, the abandonment of Popperian scientific testing constitutes the third criterion for 
immature-mature science transition.  Scientific test, according to Popper, is an 
indispensable component of scientific activity that fuels the progress of knowledge 
(Gattei 2009, 2).  Testability constitutes the criterion of demarcation between science and 
pseudoscience.  For Popper, scientific test is crucial to determine the fate of a theory.  
Hence, it would appear absurd to Popper if one contends that scientific test is 
unimportant in the mature science.   
 
 
Contrary to Popper, Kuhn claims that Popperian scientific testing has no role to play in 
the mature science.  By saying so, Kuhn does not mean that all types of test are 
unimportant in science.  The type of scientific test which is essential, according to Kuhn’s 
understanding, is not a Popperian crucial test, for it plays no decisive role as what has 
been claimed by Popper (Kuhn 1970a, 7).  Kuhnian scientific testing is a test of the 
capability of the practitioners, not of the theory (Kuhn 1970a, 7).  Speaking of testing, 
Popper refers to the test of a theory, while Kuhn refers to the test of the practitioners who 
use the theory.  To abandon Popperian testing is to abandon the crucial test for theory, but 
not the Kuhnian test.  The main reason to give up Popperian testing, though not spelled 
out by Kuhn, perhaps is that it is of the nature of critical rationalism.  As I have 
elaborated above, Kuhn views critical rationalism (expressed in critical discourse) an 
impediment to puzzle-solving, and thus it must be forgone for the realization of 
immature-mature science transition.  Thus, Popperian testing being characterized by 
critical rationalism must be abandoned for the same reason.       
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During the immature-mature science transition, Kuhnian test is expected to prevail over 
Popperian test.  The quality of a practitioner that is subject to the Kuhnian test includes 
the capability of making a right theory choice, skillfulness in experiment, and so on.  The 
criterion of theory choice would be pragmatic, for after all it is the practitioner who is 
subject to the test.  To show that he is capable, a practitioner would choose a theory 
which has more prospects in bringing out a solution to puzzle.        
 
 
4.3.2 Theory Choice in the Normal Science 
 
 
A mature science is “normal”, according to Kuhn, in two senses.  First, a mature science 
is normalized by its tradition, which is called “paradigm”.  Kuhn always relates a 
normalized mature science to paradigm in which a set of standard scientific practices and 
common beliefs are provided to guide research.  Following from this meaning of mature 
science, major disagreement among scientists will not arise.  The second sense of 
“normal” is that in a mature science there would be no crisis.  No major anomalies are 
expected in a normalized mature science.  Taken these two meanings together, a mature 
science is a normalized discipline without crisis. 
 
In this essay, ‘normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 10) 
 
 
Achievements that share these two characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as 
‘paradigms’, a term that relates closely to ‘normal science’.  By choosing it, I 
mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice—
examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—
provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research.  
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        (Kuhn 1970, 10) 
 
 
To stress the relation between mature science and normalized paradigm, Kuhn always 
uses the term “normal science” to refer to mature science.  Normal science is stable, 
largely because the paradigm that dominates it is widely accepted by the scientists.  The 
stability of normal science implies that, unlike in immature science, scientists do not 
rebuild their theories from scratch every time they do research.  They inherit the standard 
of practice (theory, methodology, laboratory protocol, puzzle-solution and etc) from their 
predecessors who are working in the same paradigm.  Scientists are heavily dependent on 
their community (an environment that makes possible research fund, research team, peer 
reviewer, journal, conference and etc) in carrying out their research.  Without scientific 
community, there would be no normal science.  For paradigm that governs normal 
science is community-based.  It is the community that normalizes the scientific practice 
and sustains the scientific tradition (paradigm).  
 
In the sciences… , the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of 
specialists’ societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum have 
usually been associated with a group’s first reception of a single paradigm. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 19) 
 
 
A scientific community can only hold at least and at most one paradigm at a time.  For 
Kuhn, a paradigm is closely related to the nature of a scientific community.  One could 
study the history and characteristics of a community in order to understand the nature of a 
paradigm.  In other words, since normal science is characterized by paradigm, normal 
science could be examined via the perspective of history and sociological characters of a 
scientific community.  It is this historical and socio-psychological approach advanced by 
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Kuhn in his elaboration of normal science in his philosophy.  Notably, this approach of 
Kuhn also invites a fame of relativism.  
 
History and social-psychology are not, my critics claim, a proper basis for 
philosophical conclusions…. But unlike most philosophers of science, I began as 
an historian of science, examining closely the facts of scientific life…. My 
criterion for emphasizing any particular aspect of scientific behaviour is therefore 
not simply that it occurs, nor merely that it occurs frequently, but rather that it fits 
a theory of scientific knowledge. 
        (Kuhn 1970b, 235-237) 
  
 
To sustain a highly united scientific community in normal science, a certain extent of 
dogmatism is required in science so that no major disagreement would emerge among 
scientists.  This dogmatism emerges in peer-review system (e.g. which article to be 
accepted as publishable), research fund (e.g. what topic of research is prioritized), text-
book writing (e.g. what theory to impart), laboratory protocols (e.g. which genome 
screening approach is used), definition of a scientific term (e.g. phylogenetic or 
recombination species concept for bacteria), and so on.  Every decision made by the 
members of a scientific community is inevitably dogmatic in certain extent, partly due to 
the trends of research and the limitation of resources.  Dogmatism also exists in the 
adopted approach to solving a puzzle.  In view of the external constraints (e.g. limitation 
of fund resources), a scientist may choose a method or equipment over another in his 
research.  Different method/equipment being chosen already presupposes different 
background theory of this method/equipment.  The observed results might be different, 
and this would contribute as a variable to the choice of the explanatory theory.    
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Extending this dogmatic practice to theory choice, Kuhn has concluded that logic and 
observation alone are necessary but insufficient criteria (Kuhn 1970b, 234; Kuhn 1970a, 
16-19).   
 
The criteria with which scientists determine the validity of an articulation or an 
application of existing theory are not by themselves sufficient to determine the 
choice between competing theories. 
        (Kuhn 1970a, 19) 
 
 
Kuhn asserts that the socio-psychological factors, which are subjective and dogmatic in 
nature, of scientist are complementary to logic and observation.  Throughout his career, 
Kuhn has never given up this socio-psychological aspect of theory choice.  It is this 
socio-psychological factor that has invited the accusation about Kuhn’s being a 
subjectivist.  Kuhn rejects this accusation, and makes explicit in his article “Objectivity, 
Value Judgment and Theory Choice” that his criteria for theory choice are objective.  In 
that article, Kuhn stresses that each of the five mentioned criteria—accuracy, consistency, 
scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness—is an objective basis for theory choice (Kuhn 1977).  
However, Kuhn points out that, though the criteria for theory choice are objective, it is 
implausible for a scientist to use them without being influenced by socio-psychological 
factors.  This subjective aspect of the use of criteria is inevitable, for “the criteria are 
imprecise” and “when deployed together, they repeatedly proved to conflict with one 
another” (Kuhn 1977, 322).  Though Kuhn has not denied the role of logic and 
observation in normal science, Kuhn’s stress on the historical-socio-psychological 
dimension of science has subsumed the former under the latter.  It is evident as Kuhn 
holds that community-based paradigms “are prior to theory” (Masterman 1970, 66) and 
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“may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research.” 
(Kuhn 1970, 46) 
 
Paradigms could determine normal science without the intervention of 
discoverable rules. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 46) 
 
While paradigms remain secure, however, they can function without agreement 
over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 48-49) 
 
 
This community-based paradigm allows a greater extent of arbitrariness in theory choice 
when Kuhn holds that a paradigm “is not the same paradigm” for individual scientists in 
a community (Kuhn 1970, 50).  What he means is that individual scientists in the same 
community are working under a different subset of paradigm.  Scientists share a common 
paradigm, but do not share the same subset of that same paradigm.  It is in this sense that 
Kuhn holds that a paradigm “is not the same paradigm” for each scientist.  This 
sociological characteristic is inevitable, for each scientist receives training in different 
institution, working with different supervisor, and reading different journal.  Such 
differences constitute different subsets of the same paradigm. 
 
Consider….the quite large and diverse community constituted by all physical 
scientists.  Each member of that group today is taught the laws of, say, quantum 
mechanics, and most of them employ these laws at some point in their research or 
teaching.  But they do not all learn the same applications of these laws…. What 
quantum mechanics means to each of them depends upon what courses he has had, 
what texts he has read, and which journals he studies…. In short, though quantum 
mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for 
many scientific groups, it is not the same paradigm for them all. 
         (Kuhn 1970, 49-50) 
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This conception of paradigmatic subset could explain the dogmatism and arbitrariness 
that are granted by Kuhn in normal science.  Though paradigm is prior to rule and logic, 
it is speaking so from the perspective of holism, which I shall call “sociological holism of 
paradigm”.  However, from the perspective of localism, rule and logic (along with the 
psychological state and experience of individual scientist) are internalized subset of a 
holistic paradigm.  Though not stated explicitly by Kuhn, this localized paradigmatic 
subset consists of two types.  The first type of paradigmatic subset is objective in nature 
(i.e. rule and logic), while the second type is subjective (i.e. personal value and 
experience).  The general agreement among scientists in holding a shared paradigm is 
maintained both by the sociological bonds (sociological holism of paradigm) and by the 
objective subset (rule and logic).  However, the application of paradigm in scientific 
practices is determined by the localized paradigmatic subsets, i.e. personal value, 
experience and the learned rule and logic.  The diverse paradigmatic subsets that 
possessed by scientists account for the variety of observation and conclusion made by 
different scientists who are working under a common paradigm.  However, this 
divergence is minor and does not lead to crisis, according to Kuhnian definition of 
normal science.  Scientists seek to reconcile their disagreement by adjusting their 
paradigmatic subsets (e.g. arriving at a consensus of the equipment being used). 
 
  
4.3.3 Paradigm Shift and Theory Choice  
 
 
Kuhn maintains that a paradigm is stable in the period of normal science.  However, a 
paradigm becomes questionable and in threat when anomalies accrued.  However, Kuhn 
holds that not all anomalies will lead to paradigm change.  Some anomalies are quickly 
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resolved by the scientists using the puzzle-solution set provided by the existing paradigm.  
Those anomalies which cannot be resolved will be accumulated, eventually resulting in 
crisis.  Scientific revolution, where change of paradigm occurs, will be the consequence if 
the crisis persists.  
 
 
Hence, it is apparent that anomaly is the initial cause which may lead to paradigm shift.  
There are two conditions for anomaly to emerge.  First, scientists are well-trained and 
capable in puzzle-solving activity.  A scientist knows “with precision what he should 
expect, is able to recognize that something has gone wrong.” (Kuhn 1970, 65)  An 
experienced scientist is unlikely to observe irregular phenomena due to the improper 
execution of laboratory procedures.  For Kuhn, anomaly is by no means any observed 
irregularity, especially those results from the aberrant observation recorded by 
inexperienced practitioners due to their lack of skills in experimentation.  An anomaly is 
an irregularity that deviates from the puzzle-solution set which is familiar by a well-
trained scientist.  Because of his knowledge and skills in the field, a well-trained scientist 
can distinguish genuine anomaly from the pseudo-anomaly which arises from the 
experimental mistakes.   
 
 
The second condition for anomaly to emerge is the maturity of a discipline, which is a 
characteristic of normal science.  The instruments and knowledge have been extensively 
developed in mature science, and it would make an observed irregularity an anomaly, for 
the irregularity cannot be explained by the well-developed pool of knowledge.  There is 
no way one could recourse to the existing puzzle-solution set to account for the 
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irregularity.  In view of the fact that anomaly emerges when the standard puzzle-solution 
fails to be effective, it is unlikely that anomaly would emerge at the initial stage of 
normal science.  It is because the knowledge domain is yet to be explored at the early 
stage of normal science.  Any irregularity observed in this early stage is expected to be 
solved with reference to puzzle-solution.   
 
Whatever the level of genius available to observe them, anomalies do not emerge 
from the normal course of scientific research until both instruments and concepts 
have developed sufficiently to make their emergence likely and to make the 
anomaly which results recognizable as a violation of expectation.  To say that an 
unexpected discovery begins only when something goes wrong is to say that it 
begins only when scientists know well both how their instruments and how nature 
should behave. 
        (Kuhn 1977, 173-174) 
 
Anomalies, by definition, exist only with respect to firmly established 
expectations.  Experiments can create a crisis by consistently going wrong only 
for a group that has previously experienced everything’s seeming to go right. 
        (Kuhn 1977, 221) 
 
 
The emergence of anomaly is always an indicator of new and unexpected discovery.  For 
Kuhn, unexpected discovery is not supposed to find its place in normal science.  It is 
because all discoveries are expected within the paradigm.  The emergence of an 
unexpected discovery in a normal science is an indication of the challenge posed by an 
anomaly to the normal science.  What Kuhn means is that the discovery in normal science 
is a normal (i.e. expected) one, not an abnormal discovery.  However, the emergence of 
anomaly which leads to the abnormal discovery is the sign of the instability of paradigm.  
Scientists start to realize that the existing paradigm does not fit the reality. 
 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition 
that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern 
normal science. 
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        (Kuhn 1970, 52-53) 
  
 
Anomaly which leads to new discovery may or may not lead to a crisis in normal science.  
If the new discovery could be assimilated with the existing paradigm, anomaly ceases 
without crisis.  The new discovery is assimilated with the paradigm in a destructive-
constructive way (Kuhn 1970, 66), that is, precision is enhanced while some standard 
beliefs are abandoned.  The corollary of the assimilation is the paradigm adjustment, 
where the fundamentals are still remained. 
 
 
However, if the new discovery could not be assimilated with the existing paradigm, 
accrued anomalies would render normal science in a state of crisis.  Scientists diverge in 
their opinion regarding the solution to anomalies.  Fundamental theories are challenged 
and no consensus is reached among scientists. 
 
In the physical sciences disagreement about fundamentals is, like the search for 
basic innovations, reserved for periods of crisis. 
        (Kuhn 1977, 222) 
 
 
The phenomenon of prolonged disagreement among scientists on the fundamental 
theories is a sign of the end of the monopolized single paradigm.  Multiple paradigms, 
each of which contains rival theories, emerge.  There is no ruling paradigm at this period 
of crisis.  Each paradigm is on an epistemic par with its rivals, each of which possesses 
different advantages over others.  Some paradigms may appear favorable in terms of its 
puzzle-solving potentials, while others may have exclusive advantage in terms of non-
cognitive value such as simplicity.  Some scholar, such as Kuukkanen, argues that Kuhn 
has put more emphasis on the puzzle-solving capability of a theory/paradigm over other 
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virtues (Kuukkanen 2007) when deciding between rival theories/paradigms.  If this 
argument is sound, one may hold that Kuhn would have claimed that puzzle-solving may 
serve as a decisive criterion for the theory/paradigm choice. However, Kuhn does not 
proclaim that puzzle-solving capability is the decisive criterion for scientist to arbitrate 
between rival theories.  Notwithstanding, as pointed by Alexander Bird (2003), Kuhn has 
recognized puzzle-solving as a driving force that propels science to progress, other non-
cognitive virtues such as simplicity, scope, and aesthetics play important role in theory 
choice as well.  It is partly because of these non-cognitive virtues and partly because of 
the socio-psychological account of paradigm shift, that incur the charge of irrationalism 
and relativism on Kuhn’s thought.  Despite Kuhn has denied the charge, he fails to 
provide a rational account of paradigm shift and theory choice. 
 
 
The dilemma that Kuhn faces could be accounted by the fact that his concept of paradigm 
is, as claimed by O’Malley and Boucher, too rigid to explain the rapid conceptual 
adjustments (O’Malley and Boucher 2005).  For Kuhnian paradigm has a defined set of 
theories, laws, and methodologies.  Kuhn always identifies theory with a paradigm, such 
that they are interchangeable concepts.  However, in the history of science, scientific 
terms and theories were always found to be shared by different paradigms.  For example, 
the theory of finite-age universe was subsumed under a pair of rival paradigms—the 
paradigm of static universe and the paradigm of expanding universe (Kragh 2007).  
However, Kuhn denies the overlapping of paradigms.  Consequently, Kuhnian choice of 
one paradigm is inevitably forgoing the useful theories which are subsumed under a rival 
paradigm. 
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4.3.4 Incommensurability and Theory Choice  
 
 
The incommensurability thesis is a problem with regard to the comparability and 
translatability between two theories.  It was raised independently by Kuhn and 
Feyerabend in 1962 (Sankey 1994, 2).  Feyerabend’s notion of incommensurability1 is his 
ground to argue against the reducibility of earlier theories to the later ones (Sankey 1994, 
2).  For Kuhn, he uses incommensurability to account for the discontinuity between rival 
paradigms in the history of science.  In addition, Kuhnian incommensurability implies the 
difficulty in evaluating rival paradigms due to the absence of shared standards and 
concepts (Chen 1997, 258).  Broadly speaking, incommensurability also implies 
communication breakdown2 between members of competing scientific communities 
(Mößner 2011, 367). 
 
In the first place, the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree 
about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must solve. Their 
standards or their definitions of science are not the same…. The transitions to 
Lavoisier’s paradigm had, like the transition to Newton’s, meant a loss not only of 
a permissible question but of an achieved solution. 
        (Kuhn 1970, 148) 
 
 
Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability has evolved from a broader to a narrower sense in 
the course of his philosophical career.  In The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 
incommensurability was applicable to methods, problem-solution, theories, and world-
change.  In the broadest sense of incommensurability, the worlds of the rival scientists are 
incommensurable3.  Notably, the latter Kuhn has reformulated his notion of 
incommensurability in response to severe criticism.  In “Commensurability, 
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Comparability, Communicability”, Kuhn has explicitly espoused a much weaker thesis of 
incommensurability, namely local incommensurability.  It is a version of 
incommensurability that claims that communication is possible across incommensurable 
theories, therefore theory comparison is possible (Kuhn 1982b).  As such, Kuhn claims 
that incommensurability of theories does not make theory choice irrational.     
 
According to Sankey’s studies on Kuhn, the “transition between incommensurable 
paradigms is a transition from the ‘world’ of one paradigm to the ‘world’ of another” 
(Sankey 1994, 21).  However, this broader sense of incommensurability received 
extensive attacks with the charge of relativism.  To respond to his critics, Kuhn has 
redefined the notion of incommensurability in a narrower, linguistic sense4, in the late 
1970s.  In the preface to The Essential Tension, Kuhn claims that such a redefinition is 
persuaded largely by the work of Quine (Kuhn 1977, xxii).  Despite the narrower 
definition, Kuhnian incommensurability retains the residue of the earlier notion of 
incommensurable world.  The advocates of different paradigms, according to the later 
version of incommensurability thesis, speak “different languages—languages expressing 
different cognitive commitments, suitable for different worlds.” (Kuhn 1977, xxii-xxiii) 
 
 
Incommensurability thesis has introduced irrationality to theory choice.  It is so because 
there are no common empirical consequences between two rival theories, for the terms of 
both theories cannot be translated point-by-point into a neutral language.  The absence of 
such neutral common language thus renders theory choice irrational. 
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The point-by-point comparison of two successive theories demands a language 
into which at least the empirical consequences of both can be translated without 
loss or change. 
         (Kuhn 1970b, 266) 
 
 
It is noteworthy to point out that, despite Kuhn’s recognition of the difficulty in theory 
translation, translation between rival theories is by no means completely impossible.  
Partial translation is possible as evident by the fact that scientists from competing schools 
may exchange their opinions.  However, Kuhn’s assertion that such partial translation is 
error-prone (Kuhn 1970b, 268) might, as viewed by rationalists, render theory choice 
irrational.  It is because theory choice is probably made on the basis of the mistranslation 
between two rival theories.    
 
 
The partial translatability of rival theories has its cause in the incommensurable worlds in 
which scientists operate.  Kuhn holds that scientists from competing schools operate in 
incommensurable worlds, that is, they perceive and interpret the phenomena differently.  
The same phenomenon means different things in the incommensurable worlds, which is 
best illustrated by Kuhn’s duck-rabbit pattern of perception.  A duck may appear as a 
rabbit if viewed from a different angle.  One cannot see both duck and rabbit at a single 
point of time.  Similarly, a phenomenon may appear as a duck-pattern to scientist A, 
while appear as a rabbit-pattern to scientist B.  The switch from one pattern to another 
requires a gestalt-switch, implying the complete switch of paradigm and world-view.  
The replacement of paradigms is necessary, for worlds that entail the phenomena are 
incommensurable. 
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Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things 
when they look from the same point in the same direction….That is why a law 
that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally 
seem intuitively obvious to another.  Equally, it is why, before they can hope to 
communicate fully, one group or the other must experience the conversion that we 
have been calling a paradigm shift. 
         (Kuhn 1970, 150) 
 
 
The incommensurable worlds do not imply the Leibnizian5 or Lewisian6 possible worlds.  
Kuhnian worlds are actual worlds that we reside.  Scientists are free to operate in 
different worlds by changing the lens of perception and interpretation.  However, a 
scientist cannot work in two worlds at the same time, according to Kuhn.  It is because 
any two worlds are inevitably incommensurable.  Some philosopher, such as Alexander 
Bird, claims that Kuhn’s thesis of world-change has “a quasi-idealist, neo-Kantian slant” 
in his later philosophical development (Bird 2002, 453), which is inferior to his earlier 
contribution in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Bird 2002).  
 
 
The incommensurable worlds lead to an unattractive consequence of theory choice.  The 
principle of rationality requires the empirical observation to serve as a necessary criterion 
for theory choice, for it is deemed objective.  Though the empirical observation is not 
equivalent to the reality, realists assume an objective correspondence between them (they 
also assume an objective correspondence in the unobservable domain).  The principle of 
rationality held by realist is that the correspondence between observation and reality is 
strictly a one-to-one relation.  No variation is allowed in the empirical observation of 
scientists, despite the possibility that these scientists may belong to rival schools.  Kuhn, 
as an anti-realist, does not assume this realist position.  Though he denies that the 
incommensurable worlds permit scientists to “see anything they please” (Kuhn 1970, 
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150), there is no strictly one-to-one correspondence relation between observation and 
reality.  Though scientists are confined by the reality in their experiment, they can 
perceive and interpret the phenomena in more than one way.  The variation in 
observation is the consequence of the variation of reality (incommensurable worlds).  
Kuhn has no means and intention to decide which reality (incommensurable world) is 
more real.  For him, all incommensurable worlds are equally valid.  This position results 
in the incomparability of the incommensurable worlds, in the sense that one cannot 
decisively weigh the value of the competing worlds.  Kuhn maintains that all 
incommensurable worlds should be relatively weighted7.  As a consequence, theory 
choice is inevitably relative and non-rational, for Kuhn assumes that scientists are 
influenced and confined by the world in which they operate. 
 
 
Many scholars have refined and developed the notion of incommensurability ever since 
its proposal.  Alasdair MacIntyre, a well-known historian and philosopher of ethics, has 
criticized that it is the conceptual incommensurability that was adopted by Kuhn that led 
him into the dilemma of irrationalism (MacIntyre 1980).  Conceptual incommensurability, 
MacIntyre argues, presupposes Cartesian account of epistemological crises.  It is an 
account that puts everything in question simultaneously, meaning to say that the totality 
of knowledge is under examination simultaneously without discrimination.  It is shown 
so, according to MacIntyre, in Kuhn’s exposition of incommensurability.  MacIntyre 
highlights that Kuhn’s conceptual incommensurability assumes the absence of complete 
contact between the view points of the proponents of rival paradigms.  It follows that the 
transition from one paradigm to another requires a leap of faith, which is a conversion 
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that is characterized as irrational.  MacIntyre argues that despite Kuhn has rejected the 
accusation of irrationalism, the Cartesian flavor of conceptual incommensurability allows 
no rational continuity between two rival paradigms.  It is because the totality of 
knowledge “is put in question simultaneously” (MacIntyre 1980, 68) and “since reason 
operates only within traditions and communities….such a transition [between paradigms] 
or a reconstruction could not be a work of reason”8 (MacIntyre 1980, 67). 
 
 
However, MacIntyre argues, Kuhn may resort to historical truth to get rid of the 
accusation of irrationalism.  History, according to MacIntyre, is presupposed by Physics.  
By history MacIntyre means the scientific tradition which encompasses scientific theory.  
As a historian of ethics, MacIntyre claims that histories can be constructed and rationally 
compared with each other.  It follows that incommensurable theories, or paradigms, are 
rationally comparable too.  Implicitly, theory choice has a rational ground as well.  
 
I am suggesting, then, that the best account that can be given of why some 
scientific theories are superior to others presupposes the possibility of 
constructing an intelligible dramatic narrative which can claim historical truth and 
in which such theories are the subject of successive episodes.  It is because and 
only because we can construct better and worse histories of this kind, histories 
which can be rationally compared with each other, that we can compare theories 
rationally too. 
          (MacIntyre 1980, 73) 
      
 
The prevalent view amongst philosophers of science is that the incommensurability thesis 
applies only to revolutionary but not normal science.  However, Szumilewicz argues that 
this is not the case.  Szumilewicz launches two criticisms to the received view of the 
incommensurability thesis (Szumilewicz 1977).  Her first criticism was plotted against 
the view that the incommensurability thesis is applicable only to the revolutionary 
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science.  According to this view, two theories are rationally comparable in normal 
science, while they could not be rationally compared in the revolutionary science.  On the 
contrary, Szumilewicz holds that the correspondence between two theories, regardless 
whether during the normal or revolutionary science, has tied incommensurability to all 
phases of science.  It is so because Szumilewicz interprets incommensurability as 
meaning variance, that is, the meaning of two successive theories, whether in normal or 
revolutionary science, “may be significantly different” (Szumilewicz 1977, 346).  
Szumilewicz’s argument has two parts.  First, she holds that the language of science is 
constantly changing.  The variability of scientific language inevitably results in the 
meaning variance of two theories.  Second, Szumilewicz argues that the divide between 
normal and revolutionary science is arbitrary.  Taken the first and the second argument 
together, Szumilewicz argues that meaning variance of theory occurs in all phases of 
science.  Since Szumilewicz takes incommensurability to mean meaning variance, it is 
apparent that incommensurability is applicable to all phases of science.  It is noteworthy 
to mention that Caneva shares Szumilewicz’s objection to the distinction between normal 
and revolutionary science, but with different reason.  Caneva argues that the existence of 
small-step continuity during paradigm shift has undermined “the historical relevance of 
incommensurability” and “undercut the distinction between normal and revolutionary 
science.”  (Caneva 2000, 100).  
 
 
The implication of Szumilewicz’s argument is that if one holds that incommensurability 
of theories implies the irrationality of theory choice (e.g. theories are not rationally 
comparable) in revolutionary science, he must have to forgo the traditional view that the 
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scientific enterprise in normal science is rational (e.g. theories are rationally comparable).  
For Szumilewicz has tied the incommensurability to all phases of science, and rejected 
the clear-cut divide between normal and revolutionary science.  In the same vein, if one 
holds that theories are rationally comparable in normal science, he must approve the view 
that the same is applicable in revolutionary science.  In short, Szumilewicz’s argument 
does not decide whether incommensurability is rational or irrational.  Her argument 
implies that if one takes incommensurability to form a rational basis for theory choice, he 
has to admit that theory choice is rational in both normal and revolutionary science; if 
one takes incommensurability to form an irrational basis for theory choice, he has to 
admit that theory choice is irrational in both normal and revolutionary science. 
 
My first criticism will be that if TI [Thesis of Incommensurability] were true it 
would apply not only to revolutionary periods but to all phases of theoretical 
change in science.  Most defenders of TI would allow that, during periods of non-
revolutionary or “normal” science, an improved theory T’ is comparable with the 
earlier theory T from which it was developed; so that rational appraisal is possible 
in these cases.  I agree.  But I claim that T’ and T will be “incommensurable” in 
these cases no less than in cases of revolutionary change: thus 
“incommensurability” either excludes rational comparison and appraisal in non-
revolutionary cases, or allows rational comparison and appraisal in revolutionary 
cases. 
        (Szumilewicz 1977, 345) 
  
 
The second criticism of Szumilewicz was directed against the view that logical relations 
do not hold between incommensurable theories (Szumilewicz 1977).  According to this 
received view, incommensurability implies incomparability of theories, due to the fact 
that the common terms of two theories have different meaning.  Szumilewicz holds that, 
on the contrary, “logical relations may hold between two theories despite their 
incommensurability” (Szumilewicz 1977, 348).  By resorting to formalizing the scientific 
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terms, Szumilewicz claims that we can compare the mathematical functions of two 
incommensurable theories independent from the semantics of them.  She suggests that 
scientists may use their intuitive understanding to map the formalized terms with their 
corresponding meanings.  With such an optimistic view to relate the formal aspect with 
the content of the scientific terms, Szumilewicz concludes that “meaning variance need 
not render T and T’ [incommensurable theories] rationally incomparable” (Szumilewicz 
1977, 349).  However, Szumilewicz’s strategy is not without problem.  On the one hand, 
she does not demonstrate how to warrant the precise mapping between formalized terms 
and their semantic content.  On the other hand, Szumilewicz’s strategy to compare the 
formal aspect of the scientific terms may not be viable in the cases where the scientific 
terms are lacking of mathematical form (e.g. scientific terms such as ‘gene’, ‘organism’, 
‘tarsal bone’).  Carnap’s failure in providing a logical construction of the world serves as 
a good example that it is impossible to formalize all scientific and ordinary terms9.            
 
 
4.3.5  Incommensurability and Philosophy of Biology 
 
In Kuhn’s writing, he never applied incommensurability to biology, though he uses 
biological concepts as an analogy to the lexical taxonomy.  It is intellectually interesting 
to probe into this area, as biology has achieved significant breakthrough and rapid 
advancement since the proposal of the double helix model of DNA by Watson and Crick 
in 1953.  The emergence of new discoveries, especially in molecular biology, has led to 
the establishment of many promising sub-disciplines.  One of them is the emergence of 
evolutionary biology.  However, the notion of biological process in evolutionary biology, 
which is a central concept, has not reached a consensus among scientists.  Many 
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incommensurable interpretations of this notion exist among different scientists (Delisle 
2011, 57).  The notion of gene trees serves as another example of incommensurability in 
biological science.  In the paradigm of phylogenetics, gene trees refer to the gene 
hierarchy of an organism; whereas in the paradigm of population genetics, gene trees are 
gene hierarchy of species (Knowles 2009).  The same word denotes different meaning in 
different paradigms, though its evolutionary meaning is retained.  Tracing the history 
further backward to Darwinian period, gene trees, which was called heredity at that time, 
did not have evolutionary meaning.  It was not a concept which “necessarily imply 
support for programmes of selective breeding” (Paul 2009, 234).  Darwin’s conception of 
heredity was material and particulate (Gayon 2000, 72), it “was less the past (ancestry) 
than the present structure of these collections of units [gemmules, which are small buds 
generated by cells]” (Gayon 2000, 73)    
 
 
However, it was reported that there are terms and concepts which did not differ in their 
meaning under different paradigms, such as the term “substitution rate”, which retained 
the same meaning under the paradigm of single calibration point model and the paradigm 
of relaxed-clock model (Ho and Phillips 2009). 
 
 
The phenomenon of incommensurability also persists in systems biology, which is a new 
sub-discipline of biology that emerged in 2000s (Arkin and Schaffer, 2011).  It is a 
discipline that encompasses cell biology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, information 
management, and genetics.  Systems biologists aim to study how the biochemical 
processes of individual cell contribute to the behaviors and survival of an organism 
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(Arkin and Schaffer 2011).  One of the challenges faced by systems biologists is to 
explain the cellular process in terms of information management (Nurse and Hayles 2011, 
853).  It is not an easy task, for to translate the biochemical laboratory results into the 
information processing data elements requires a new approach to bridge two distinct 
disciplines, which are completely incommensurable.        
 
 
Calvert and Fujimura argue that the works of systems biologists involve paradigm shifts 
between different epistemic concepts, which occurred as the consequence of its 
interdisciplinary nature (Calvert and Fujimura 2011).  In their interview, Calvert and 
Fujimura found that systems biologists were able to collaborate despite their difference in 
epistemic commitments and background training10.  They thus conclude that the 
differences between paradigms do not present hurdle for the collaboration between 
systems biologists, which implies that distinct paradigms are not incommensurable.  This 
conclusion is opposed to Kuhn’s, as he claims that paradigms are incommensurable. 
 
Nevertheless, in all these cases, collaboration required a great deal of negotiation 
and labour at the borders [of different fields].  It may be that differences between 
paradigms, epistemologies, or methods do not constitute incommensurable 
boundaries to collaboration.  With enough desire, commitment, and labour, these 
differences may not only be surmounted, they may be productive. 
      (Calvert and Fujimura 2011, 162) 
 
 
Calvert and Fujimura assert that the differences in paradigms held amongst systems 
biologists may be surmounted with enough efforts.  They do not imply that the corollary 
of the collaboration amongst systems biologists is to adhere to a single paradigm.  It is 
unlikely to happen because the research team is comprised of scientists from diverse 
fields.  Conversely, multiple paradigms are in effect dominating the collaboration.  Such 
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situation is made possible by the mutual appreciation of the differences in paradigms and 
values.  
 
Communication across disciplines in systems biology could be made easier if 
members of the field have a greater awareness and appreciation of their different 
epistemic assumptions and values. 
       (Calvert and Fujimura 2011, 162)  
 
 
Burian takes incommensurability in biology to be interpreted against two backgrounds: 
the reduction theory and the referential discontinuity (Burian 2005).  The reduction 
theory demonstrates that there is a fundamental theory to which other theories could be 
reduced to, or deduced from.  The typical example of the reduction theory is the claim 
that Mendelian genetics could be reduced to molecular genetics (Burian 2005, 130).  This 
claim is established on the assumption that the reduced theory has definitions and 
statements which are entailed by the fundamental theory.  According to Burian, the 
mistake of reduction theory is its false presupposition of the continuity between two 
distinct theories.   
 
Were this account of reduction correct, the concepts of the reduced theory would 
be, in effect, definable within the more fundamental theory, and the claims of the 
reduced theory would be a subclass of the claims of the fundamental theory.  In 
fact, as is now generally recognized, reduction of this sort virtually never occurs 
in science. 
        (Burian 2005, 130-131) 
 
 
Although Burian does not proclaim to hold a view of radical incommensurability, his 
argument against reduction theory has implied incommensurability in terms of scientific 
definition of the terms used in two theories.  It is a kind of conceptual 
incommensurability.  In fact, many opponents of the reduction theory11 have also argued 
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that “the key concepts of successive theories are in fact incommensurable in meaning.” 
(Rosenberg 2008, 550).  Notably, Burian does not explicitly subscribe to the view of 
paradigm in biology.  Nonetheless, he holds that the phenomenon of incommensurability 
implies that the relation between two biological theories could not be reductive12.      
 
Worse yet, when one comes to cases like …. Mendelian versus molecular genetics, 
discontinuity theorists have put forth quite convincing arguments to show that the 
concepts of the theory to be reduced simply cannot be reproduced within the 
successor theory.  This claim, as I argue, seems to be entirely in accord with the 
facts. 
        (Burian 2005, 131) 
 
 
Besides, Burian also interprets incommensurability in terms of referential discontinuity.  
Referential discontinuity is not the same with referential indeterminacy which had been 
made known by Quine and Donald Davidson.  The proponents of referential 
indeterminacy hold that reference is, in an indefinitely many different referential relation, 
solely determined by the use of language (Nimtz 2005).   According to the Davidsonian 
thesis of referential indeterminacy, interpretation is inevitably indeterminate, for it is hard 
to apply the rule precisely and arrive at the agreement on the observable (Davidson 2004, 
157).  The notion of referential indeterminacy does not entail incommensurability, but the 
notion of referential discontinuity does. 
 
 
In Kuhnian thesis of referential discontinuity, a reference does not stay constant through 
paradigm shift, that is, a term may refer to different references in two paradigms.  Burian 
argues, based on the history of genetics, that the referential discontinuity of genetic terms 
is held accountable by the scientific community.  For “the terms are—in a certain sense—
community property.” (Burian 2005, 133).  The referential discontinuity happens when 
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the refinement of method shifts the reference of a term.  It follows that the references are 
incommensurable after the shift of reference.  Burian implies that scientific community 
plays a major role in the incommensurability of reference. 
 
It is, of course, true that the procedures by which factors (or genes) are identified 
and individuated can be refined and improved in ways that may shift the reference 
of particular terms; such refinements can change altogether the set of entities to 
which a community refers by use of such terms as “gene” and “factor”.  But, the 
terms are—in a certain sense—community property…. The point about the social 
character of the referential use of scientific and prescientific terms is rather 
stronger than it looks. 
        (Burian 2005, 133)        
    
 
Marcel Weber studies incommensurability in biology from three perspectives: translation 
failure, non-corresponding predictions, and referential discontinuity (Weber 2002).  He 
examines the problems in light of the oxidative phosphorylation controversy13 in the 
history of biochemistry.  It was a dispute about how mitochondria, the organelle of cell 
which generates energy to sustain cellular activities, generate energy in the form of 
adenosine triphosphate (ATP).  According to Weber, there were two incommensurable 
paradigms:  The chemical paradigm proposed by Slater and the chemiosmotic paradigm 
proposed by Mitchell.   
 
 
The chemical paradigm was the old paradigm, which conferred to enzyme-bound 
chemical compound, known as ‘high-energy intermediate’, a vital role in converting a 
molecule of adenosine diphosphate (ADP) to form energy—ATP.  This paradigm was 
widely accepted in 1960s because it was modeled after a successful mechanism to 
generate energy from sugar, which was the ATP-generating step of glycolysis.  However, 
there was no crucial evidence to prove that the chemical paradigm is true, for being true 
  
256 
the hypothesized high-energy intermediate must exist.  Unfortunately, this chemical 
intermediate was not found in the experiment. 
 
 
The chemiosmotic paradigm did not postulate high-energy intermediate as the chemical 
paradigm did.  It proposed that the electrochemical potential generated via diffusion of 
proton across mitochondrial membrane has been a factor that converts ADP to form 
energy—ATP.   
 
 
Weber analyzes that both chemical paradigm and chemiosmotic paradigm encompass 
incommensurable terms, such as “high-energy intermediate” in the chemical paradigm 
and “proton-motive force” in the chemiosmotic paradigm, which differ in sense and 
reference.  The fact that these terms do not logically contradict each other, Weber argues, 
leads to translation failure.  Weber further demonstrates that an attempt to translate the 
theoretical statements of one paradigm into another will inevitably lose inferential 
relations. 
 
 
Non-corresponding prediction is another consequence of incommensurability14.  Weber 
holds that it is a situation where the predictions made by a paradigm have no 
corresponding ones made in another.  Similarly, Hoyningen-Huene has highlighted the 
difficulty of the problem of non-corresponding prediction (Hoyningen-Huene 2000).  He 
analyzes the issue of corresponding prediction for both commensurable and 
incommensurable theories.  He argues that in comparing two commensurable theories, 
there is always a corresponding prediction.  The difficulty lies only in the situation where 
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each theory has its own strength.  However, incommensurable theories have no 
corresponding prediction, because of “the difference in their concepts and the 
untranslatability of both theories.” (Hoyningen-Huene 2000, 105).  Weber’s 
understanding of non-corresponding prediction as a feature of incommensurability in 
biology is inline with Hoyningen-Huene’s.  He argues with examples that both the 
chemical paradigm and the chemiosmotic paradigm predicted no common thing.  The 
chemical paradigm predicted energy-link functions by which no corresponding prediction 
was found in the chemiosmotic paradigm.  The chemiosmotic paradigm predicted proton 
translocation by which no corresponding prediction was found in the chemical paradigm.  
Hence, Weber concludes that non-corresponding prediction is the feature of 
incommensurability that occurred in the history of biochemistry. 
 
  
The third, and the last, perspective of incommensurability studied by Weber was 
referential discontinuity.  The high-energy intermediate in the chemical paradigm was not 
presupposed in the chemiosmotic paradigm.  It was replaced by “a whole new kind of 
bioenergetic mechanicsm” (Weber 2002, 8), which was a proton-motive mechanism 
underlain by the intermediate of glycolysis and the citric acid cycle.  The chemical 
intermediates in these paradigms were not a straightforward replacement, for they were 
two different entities.  Hence, Weber concludes that the referential discontinuity was 
observed in the paradigm shift from the chemical to the chemiosmotic paradigm. 
 
 
The kinds of incommensurability that are discussed in the above-mentioned literatures of 
philosophy of biology were elaborated, in a more general sense, by Sankey.  He takes 
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incommensurability to be a semantical problem which has to do with the languages of 
scientific theories (Sankey 1994).  He has given a broad definition of incommensurability 
as such: 
  
Broadly speaking, to say that a pair of theories is incommensurable is to say that 
the theories do not share a common language, or that the terms they employ do 
not have common meaning. 
        (Sankey 1994, 1) 
 
 
Sankey analyzes that incommensurability stems from the semantic dependence of the 
scientific terms on the theoretical contexts.  Contrary to Kuhn, Sankey holds that 
incommensurability is not a common phenomenon.  He distinguishes two types of 
semantic incommensurability: semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and 
semantic incommensurability due to discontinuity of reference (Sankey 2009).  
According to Sankey, it is the latter that presents challenges to scientific realism.  
However, Sankey does not worry about such challenge, as he argues that it is dismissible 
by a modified causal theory of reference (Sankey 1994).    
 
 
Meaning variance of two theories, Sankey argues, gives rise to translation failure and 
referential discontinuity (Sankey 1994, 1998).  He points out that Kuhn takes meaning 
change between theories to “include variation of reference as well as sense” (Sankey 
2009, 197).  Meaning variation of incommensurable theories results in the 
untranslatability of the theoretical terms. 
 
Untranslatability has a central role in the incommensurability thesis.  If a pair of 
theories is incommensurable, then the languages employed by the theories are 
partially or wholly untranslatable.  In addition, translation and content comparison 
have a close connection according to the thesis.  Since the content of theories 
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expressed in untranslatable languages is inexpressible within a shared vocabulary, it 
appears not to be directly comparable. 
                 (Sankey 1994, 73) 
 
 
Sankey rejects the idea that incommensurable theories are wholly untranslatable (Sankey 
1994).  However, he claims that translation failure of incommensurable theories implies 
partial untranslatability, which is the impossibility of word-to-word translation.  Further, 
Sankey argues that untranslatability does not imply communication failure between 
incommensurable theories, for the causal theory of reference “allows referential overlap 
and comparison even in the absence of translation” (Sankey 1994, 220).  Translation 
failure does not present a hurdle for the comparison of rival theories.  Hence, in Sankey’s 
account, theory choice is possible in the presence of translation failure. 
 
 
Sankey has defended Kuhn’s later notion of taxonomic categories against translation 
failure.  He calls this taxonomic account of incommensurability as taxonomic 
incommensurability (Sankey 1998).  It is a thesis which “involves differences between 
the taxonomic categories which scientific theories employ” (Sankey 1998, 7).  Entities 
are categorized according to taxonomy (Bird 2002).  For Kuhn, taxonomic terms are also 
known as kind terms (Kuhn 2000, 92 cited in Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim 2009, 
206).  Hence, it is apparent that Kuhn does not take taxonomy to be a mere semantic 
construct, but it also refers to entity or kind.  According to Kuhn, the taxonomic 
categories are clusters that group the scientific terms (Kuhn 1983).  Kuhn, in 1980s, has 
rejected the notion that a scientific term is to be understood and applied in a universal 
context.  Instead, he claims that scientific terms are categorized into different taxonomic 
clusters and they should be interpreted in an interconnected way. 
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Many of the referring terms of at least scientific languages cannot be acquired or 
defined one at a time but must instead be learned in clusters….. The Newtonian 
terms ‘force’ and ‘mass’ provide the simplest sort of example.  One cannot learn 
how to use either one without simultaneously learning how to use the other.  Nor 
can this part of the language-acquisition process go forward without resort to 
Newton’s Second Law of Motion.  Only with its aid can one learn how to pick out 
Newtonian forces and masses, how to attach the corresponding terms to nature. 
        (Kuhn 1983, 566) 
 
 
Sankey concurs with Kuhn that taxonomic categories do not render complete 
untranslatability but local untranslatability (Sankey 1993).  Since taxonomic categories 
are interconnected, the languages of two intertranslatable theories must have the same 
taxonomic structure.  A successful translation requires the preservation of categories.  
However, argued Sankey, the interconnected categories undergo a radical change in 
meaning and reference after translation.  Translation between local clusters of terms fails 
because those terms are interconnected and inter-defined.   
 
Translation between such local complexes of terms fails because the meaning of 
such terms is determined in relation to other terms of the interdefined set.  Terms 
which are defined within an integrated set of concepts cannot be translated in 
piecemeal fashion into an alternative complex in which the necessary conceptual 
relations do not obtain. 
         (Sankey 1993, 772) 
 
 
Sankey (1998) criticizes Kuhn’s inference from the notion of untranslatability between 
theories to the denial of evaluating the merit of the theories in terms of truth.  Sankey 
argues that “rival theories may make more or less true claims about the same entities, 
despite untranslatability” (Sankey 1998, 12).  He asserts that at least some of the terms 
employed by the theories must refer to the same entities, thus making the rational theory 
choice plausible. 
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Lastly, I turn to Stegmüller’s structuralist reconstruction of Kuhn’s incommensurability 
thesis.  Stegmüller proclaims that he has developed an “entirely new approach to the 
analysis of the structure of scientific theories” (Stegmüller 1976, vii), which could be 
used as a source of conceptual apparatus to rationally reconstruct Kuhn’s notion of 
normal science and scientific revolution.  This so-called “new approach” is a non-
statement view of theories, that is, to interpret theories as set-theoretic predicates rather 
than classes of empirical statements.  Contrary to the tradition, Stegmüller’s approach 
does not characterize scientific theory as a linguistic entity.  In other words, Stegmüller 
attempts to axiomatize scientific theory by understanding the empirical claims as 
Ramsey-Sneed-sentences (Stegmüller 1979).  Stegmüller states that “instead of working 
with formalized languages and formalized theories of logic”, non-statement view of 
theories “makes use of informal set theory and logic only”. (Stegmüller 1979, 83)  
 
In contrast to the statement view, a theory itself is interpreted as a composite 
mathematical structure together with a class of intended applications. 
       (Stegmüller 1976, 14) 
 
There are good reasons for not identifying a theory with the central empirical 
claim….. A theory itself is characterized as a nonlinguistic entity: namely, as an 
ordered pair consisting of a core K and the class of intended applications I. 
       (Stegmüller 1976, 16)  
 
….. empirical claims of theories are not to be formulated by infinite sets of 
sentences, but rather each by a Ramsey-Sneed-sentence. 
       (Stegmüller 1979, 24) 
 
Now what about scientific revolutions? Can the logician also contribute to a better 
understanding of this phenomenon?  Here I should like to begin with a confession 
so that you will not be too terribly disappointed with the following remarks: The 
logician can actually accomplish far less in this case than in the case of the 
phenomenon which Kuhn called normal science.  This is not because scientific 
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revolutions are in fact thoroughly irrational processes, but simply because many 
aspects of these phenomena lie outside the competence of the logician. 
       (Stegmüller 1980, 83) 
       
 
The reason that drives Stegmüller to formulate a non-statement view of theories lies in 
the problem of theoretical terms, which arises from the empirical statements of theory.  
Empirical statements contain theoretical terms, which could not be substantiated in the 
meaning.  What Stegmüller means is that the effort to understand theoretical terms is 
enormously difficult, for theoretical terms are self-referential in the interpretation.  
Logical inferences are of no help here. 
 
The traditional idea concerning the empirical claims of a theory leads to a 
difficulty in all cases in which such claims contain theoretical terms.  In order to 
substantiate a claim of the form “ci is an S”, one must always refer back to a 
statement “cj is an S,” i.e., to a statement of exactly this form.         
        (Stegmüller 1976, 15) 
   
 
Stegmüller holds that non-statement view of theories could be used as an approach to 
rationally defend Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability.  According to him, Kuhn’s 
explication of incommensurability was based on the statement view of theories.  The 
theoretical terms contained within the empirical statements are thus self-referential.  At 
the macro level, any choice between paradigms is circular and indeterminate.  
Communication breakdown is inevitable in Kuhnian statement view of incommensurable 
theories, for there is no neutral meta-language. 
 
[Kuhn’s] exposition of this sort of scientific revolution, which we will call the 
dislodging of a theory by a substitute theory, contains an exaggeration and a 
mistake. 
        (Stegmüller 1976, 214) 
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[In Kuhn’s statement view of theories] we need only remember statements to the 
effect that any argument in favor of a paradigm (i.e., in favor of a theory <K,I0> ) 
is basically circular, that the proponents of various theories can not communicate 
due to the lack of a neutral metalanguage…. 
        (Stegmüller 1976, 215)  
 
 
Kuhn’s statement view of theories renders the inferential relations between theories 
impossible.  Hence, Stegmüller points out, Kuhn argues that there is no logical 
deducibility between two theories.  However, Kuhn’s critics condemn his 
incommensurability thesis from the perspective of statement view of theories.  Such 
critique is persuasive as, in the context of statement view, the failure of inferability and 
reducibility between theories renders scientific progress irrational.  To salvage Kuhnian 
incommensurability from irrationalism, Stegmüller proposes that the reducibility of 
theories cannot be defined in terms of inference.     
 
Kuhn details there the reasons why Newtonian dynamics may not be said to be 
deducible from relativistic dynamics.  This argument is a joke.  Kuhn uses the 
metatheoretic ‘paradigm’ of his opponents to support the incommensurability 
thesis.  For the ‘statement view’, reduction problems can only turn on one thing: 
namely, the ‘inference relations between classes of sentences.’  However, instead 
of arguing from noninferability to nonreducibility, we will argue that an adequate 
concept of reduction cannot be defined in terms of inference. 
        (Stegmüller 1976, 216) 
 
 
Stegmüller holds that the reducibility of one theory to another is important to account for 
scientific progress.  It is this reason that Stegmüller thinks that a rational account of 
incommensurability should not evade from answering the problem of reduction.  From 
the perspective of non-statement view, Stegmüller proposes an alternative notion of 
reduction, which is non-inferential in nature.  He treats theories as sets to which the 
reduction relations, construed as functions, hold.  In mathematics, function is an abstract 
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construct that maps domain to range.  In Stegmüller’s account, reduction relation between 
two theories is interpreted as function mapping between two sets.  The concepts and laws 
are the elements of theory-sets.  The reduction relation is a set-theoretic (non-linguistic 
and non-logical) mapping of the concept-element and law-element of a reducing theory-
set to the concept-element and law-element of a reduced theory-set.   
 
 
By formalizing reduction in set-function, Stegmüller need not consider the meaning of 
theoretical terms.  Hence, his account is free from the problem of translation failure, 
comparability, and referential discontinuity; not because these problems do not exist, but 
they are irrelevant in the context of set-function.  For, in mathematics, the semantics of 
domain and range of two sets is not important.  What matters is the mapping rule.  Given 
a function and a mapping rule, the relation between two sets always holds.  Stegmüller’s 
account of non-statement view of theory transforms the reduction relation from the 
traditional logical and semantic relation to a mathematical function.  The reduction 
relation is thus a mapping from domain of a theory to the range of another.  The elements 
(i.e., concepts, law) of theory-set are mapped to the corresponding theory according to 
the mapping rule of the function.  Hence, speaking of incommensurability between two 
theories, the charge of translation failure and referential discontinuity has nothing to do 
with the scientific terms (the element of theory-set).  The cause of incommensurability 
lies in the structure of theory-set.  For, in mathematics, given a mapping rule, two 
incommensurable sets could enter into a functional relation, which is the reduction 
relation in Stegmüller’s case. 
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The reduction is to be realized via a reduction relation which ‘transposes’ the 
basic concepts of T into those of T’, and indeed in such a way that the basic laws 
of T can then be ‘mapped’ onto those of T’. 
           (Stegmüller 1976, 128) 
 
Thus it appears appropriate to construe the reduction relation as a one-many 
relation with the domain M
 pp and the range M’pp. 
        (Stegmüller 1976, 128) 
 
 
By showing that the reduction relation between two incommensurable theories is a set-
function relation, and by rejecting the traditional idea that reduction is a logical relation, 
Stegmüller claims that his structuralist approach could salvage Kuhnian 
incommensurability thesis from the charge of irrationalism and relativism.  Without 
rejecting incommensurability thesis, Stegmüller holds that set-theoretic interpretation of 
theory is rational, based on the assumption that the set theory and function in 
mathematics are a rational approach.  It is a reasonable assumption because set theory 
“provides mathematics with its foundation” (Bagaria 2008, 616).   
 
 
Stegmüller interprets incommensurability thesis as a problem which lies in the 
incommensurability of domain and range of two theories, which is different from the 
traditional view that incommensurability lies in the scientific terms of two theories.  Thus, 
Stegmüller does not need to account for the translation failure between scientific terms in 
the context of semantics and logic.  By resorting to the rationality of mathematics, 
incommensurability (i.e., translation failure, referential discontinuity) is unquestionably 
rational in Stegmüller’s account.  Hence, if one is to question Stegmüller’s account, she 
should have looked into the legitimacy of axiomatizing theory as set15 and reduction 
relation as function.  However, if one is able to show that it is illegitimate to adopt 
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Stegmüller’s approach, the most he can say is that Stegmüller’s incommensurability 
thesis is illegitimate; he can not in the least claim that Stegmüller’s incommensurability is 
irrational, because Stegmüller’s incommensurability is modeled after mathematics, which 
is a rational enterprise.       
    
 
4.4 Feyerabend and the Problem of Theory Choice  
 
 
4.4.1 Feyerabend’s Relativist Position 
 
 
Feyerabend is a well-known relativist on scientific theory.  He opposes the realist 
correspondence theory of truth, according to which there is a one-to-one correspondence 
relation between theory and reality.  Feyerabend holds that such correspondence does not 
warrant truth, for “any false theory can be made to fit the facts” (Feyerabend 1981, 5).  If 
any theory can be made in an ad hoc way to account for the facts, the credentials of the 
theory are thus questionable.  According to Feyerabend, theory is an instrument that can 
be created in any way to explain the reality.  That is why Feyerabend asserts that any 
false theory can be made to fit the facts.  Hence, it is natural for Feyerabend to come to 
doubt about the realist account of objectivity of theories.  He is a skeptic about realist 
objectivity, which does not question only the truthfulness of realist objectivity, but also 
confront the superiority of realist notion of objectivity.  
 
But if objectivism while perhaps acceptable as a particular point of view cannot 
claim objective superiority over other ideas, then the objective way of posing 
problems and presenting results is not the right way for the relativist to adopt.  
        (Feyerabend 2002, 78) 
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The rejection of realist notion of objective theory does not imply the denial of objectivity 
in Feyerabend’s thought.  The very objectivity that is rejected is the assertion that 
scientific theories are universal and the reality can only be explained in one definite way.  
The proponents of universal scientific theory claim that a true scientific theory should be 
applicable to all phenomena spatio-temporally; whereas the proponents of definite reality 
maintain that the reality manifests itself in only one way.  Feyerabend, as a skeptic who 
maintains that one can never know reality as it is, modestly asserts that we should not 
expect a universal theory could be formulated to account for the reality in a one-to-one 
corresponding way.   He contends that “the world we inhabit is abundant beyond our 
wildest imagination” (Feyerabend 2001, 3)    
 
A relativist who deserves his name will then have to refrain from making 
assertions about the nature of reality, truth and knowledge and will have to keep 
to specifics instead.  He may and often will generalise his findings but without 
assuming that he now has principles which by their very nature are useful, 
acceptable and, most importantly, binding for all.  Debating with objectivists, he 
may of course use objectivist methods and assumptions; however, his purpose 
will not be to establish universally acceptable truths (about particulars or 
generalities) …… 
        (Feyerabend 2002, 78) 
  
 
Feyerabend complains that realist notion of objectivity renounces the subjective element 
of theory.  Realists hold that a true theory must objectively reflect the corresponding 
reality.  They reject the idea that scientific theory could be formulated based on personal 
bias.  As a skeptic, Feyerabend suggests that both subjective and objective elements are 
indispensable in scientific theories. 
 
More recent developments in the interpretation of quantum mechanics suggest 
regarding such appearances [of atoms] as phenomena (Bohr’s term) that transcend 
the dichotomy subjective/objective…. They are “subjective”, for they could not 
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exist without the idiosyncratic conceptual and perceptual guidance of some point 
of view (which need not be available in explicit form); but they are also 
“objective”: not all ways of thinking have results and not all perceptions are 
trustworthy. 
        (Feyerabend 2001, 143) 
 
The “subjective” side of knowledge, being inextricably intertwined with its 
material manifestations, cannot be just blown away. 
        (Feyerabend 2001, 146) 
 
 
The acceptance of subjective element of scientific theory shows that Feyerabend’s 
conception of truth is very much different from that of realist.  For realist, there is only 
one definite truth for each physical phenomenon; while for Feyerabend, truth is non-
definite because he has conceived of a possible pluralistic reality according to which he 
has sometimes called “the abundance of reality”.  Though Feyerabend admits that 
simplification of the abundance of reality is needed in science, but there is certainly more 
than one way of simplification (Feyerabend 2001, 241).  Even in the presence of a monist 
reality, truth could be manifested in more than one way.  It is this belief that makes 
Feyerabend accepts non-scientific account (such as myth) of world picture. 
 
A myth can very well stand on its own feet.  It can give explanations, it can reply 
to criticism, it can give a satisfactory account even of events which prima facie 
seem to refute it.  It can do this because it is absolutely true.  It has therefore, 
something to offer.  It has to offer truth, absolute truth. 
        (Feyerabend 1999, 64) 
 
 
From the above quotation, it seems to Feyerabend that a true theory must be able to give 
explanations, reply to criticisms and provide a satisfactory account of the reality.  
Apparently, a true theory is measured by its capability of providing a reasonable picture 
of reality, not by its capability of providing a matching picture, as what scientific realist 
does, of reality.  A matching picture of reality requires a one-to-one correspondence 
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between theory and fact, which is a scenario where there is only a ruling theory.  A 
reasonable picture of reality does not have realist objective truth as its prerequisite.  It 
does not require a single ruling theory to explain the reality.  In fact, a single ruling 
theory, Feyerabend argues, is detrimental.  It is a new form of authoritarianism and 
superstition, which is a dogma scientists aim to obviate at the start.  Therefore, a 
reasonable picture of reality requires pluralism of theory.  That is, a physical 
phenomenon should be accounted not only by science, but also by non-science.  
Strikingly, Feyerabend states that these pluralistic pictures of reality are all true theories, 
because they are able to provide a reasonable picture of reality. 
 
A truth that reigns without checks and balances is a tyrant who must be 
overthrown and any falsehood that can aid us in the overthrow of this tyrant is to 
be welcomed. 
        (Feyerabend 1984, 138) 
 
There is no idea, however ancient and absurd that is not capable of improving our 
knowledge.  The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for 
improving every single theory.  Nor is political interference rejected.  It may be 
needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the 
status quo. 
        (Feyerabend 1978, 47) 
 
 
The consequence of an explicit distinction between reality and picture of reality is that 
one cannot have a single definite knowledge, as what is pursued by scientific realists.  
Despite one cannot influence reality, his social and personal characteristics do penetrate 
into the picture of reality of which he conceives.  Scientific theory, as one of the many 
pictures of reality, is inevitably influenced by the contingent factors of individual 
scientists and their community.  Hence, Feyerabend contends that the blossom of a 
variety of (even contradictory) theories in science is expected and should be welcomed. 
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Being tied to individuals and groups a world-view cannot be ‘Platonized’—it 
cannot be presented as a person-independent entity that enters into relations with 
other person-independent entities such as facts and/or theories; it has to be related 
to the individuals and the communities that are affected by it. 
           (Feyerabend 1994, 156) 
 
 
It is interesting to compare the view of Feyerabend and Wittgenstein on the picture of 
reality.  Feyerabend had shown great enthusiasm in Wittgenstein’s thought since he was a 
university student.  He was initially planned to study with Wittgenstein, but Wittgenstein 
died before his arrival in England (Preston 1997, 3).  Consequently, Feyerabend studied 
with Popper whose “ideas were similar to those of Wittgenstein but they were more 
abstract and anaemic” (Feyerabend 1978a, 116).  Undoubtedly, Feyerabend was familiar 
with Wittgenstein’s works.  He read “Philosophical Investigations in detail” and “rewrote 
the book so that it looked more like a treatise with a continuous argument.”16 
(Feyerabend 1978a, 115-116).  He even admitted that “there is much Wittgenstein in all 
my papers” (Feyerabend 1995a, 50).   
 
 
Wittgenstein construes reality as atomic fact in his early philosophy.  In this account, the 
picture of reality is represented by the atomic propositions.   
 
A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the 
situation that it represents. 
        (Wittgenstein 1988, 39) 
 
A proposition shows its sense.  A proposition shows how things stand if it is true.  
And it says that they do so stand. 
        (Wittgenstein 1988, 41) 
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However, Wittgenstein has abandoned this idea in his later philosophy and turned to 
embrace a thesis of meaning-is-use (Hanna 2010).  The later Wittgenstein claims that the 
pure referentialism that was embraced in his early philosophy does not account for the 
variation of meaning of the same referent (Hanna 2010, 19).  Further, the picture of 
reality that is represented by proposition follows the principle of middle exclusion: “a 
proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no” (Wittgenstein 1988, 41). 
 
 
The objection to the principle of middle exclusion is apparent in Feyerabend’s thought as 
well.  His tenet of relativism rejects the kind of “yes or no” correspondence between 
reality and theory.  There exists no absolute correspondence, and a relativist picture of 
reality should be adopted.  Hence, in making a choice of theory, one should not be 
confined to the principle of middle exclusion.  That is, one should not be tempted to think 
that a theory must be either true or false.  Moreover, one should also not to conceive the 
reality as represented by only one theory.  On the contrary, one should always presume 
that the reality can have more than one picture, viz., can be represented equally well by 
more than one theory.  Such assumption would undoubtedly influence the choice between 
rival theories.  Feyerabend’s assertion that the interpretation of the reality is dependent on 
the theory which explains it is clearly a Wittgensteinian thesis of meaning-is-use.  
Whichever theory being chosen is not a matter about objective truth, for Feyerabend’s 
conception of truth is not confined to accuracy and predictive success.  What matters in 
theory choice is that the qualified theory should be able to picture the reality, in the sense 
that it “can give explanations, it can reply to criticism, it can give a satisfactory account” 
of the reality (Feyerabend 1999, 64). 
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….what is determined by the ‘facts’ is the acceptance (or rejection) of sentences 
which are already interpreted and which have been interpreted independently of 
the phenomenological character of what is observed.  The impression that every 
fact suggests one and only one interpretation and that therefore our views are 
‘determined’ by the facts, this impression will arise only when (with respect to the 
language used) the relation of phenomenological adequacy is a one-one relation. 
        (Feyerabend 1981, 34) 
 
 
The objection to realist correspondence theory of truth leads Feyerabend to conclude that 
truth is local.  A theory is true in certain context while not so in others.  The criterion of 
theory choice is thus local.  There is no universal criterion to arbitrate amongst rival 
theories.  A criterion used in a context (Feyerabend sometimes calls it ‘tradition’) as a 
rational standard for theory choice may be deemed irrational in another context.  
Feyerabend holds that the rationality of standard is an integral part of the context, which 
may vary from one context to another.  Science is, as seen by Feyerabend, historically 
relative because the rationality that endorses it is relative. 
 
We have seen that rational standards and the arguments supporting them are 
visible parts of special traditions consisting of clear and explicit principles and an 
unnoticed and largely unknown but absolutely necessary background of 
dispositions for action and judgement.  The standards become ‘objective’ 
measures of excellence when adopted by participants of traditions of this kind. 
          (Feyerabend 1978a, 27) 
  
…….judgements are made by individuals who participate in traditions and use 
them to separate ‘Good’ from ‘Evil’…… rationality is not an arbiter of traditions, 
it is itself a tradition or an aspect of a tradition.  It is therefore neither good nor 
bad, it simply is. 
        (Feyerabend 1978a, 27) 
 
 
However, the notion of local criterion of theory choice is not without problem.  Since the 
choice is context-dependent, and Feyerabend claims that truth is specific to 
context/tradition, the truth of a choice is inevitably context-dependent.  For example, in 
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the context of myth, metaphors and story-telling serve as the criteria for Feyerabendian 
truth.  Scientific criteria of truth such as accuracy and simplicity play no role here, 
because they are not a part of myth.  The criterion of theory choice in myth is dependent 
on the conception of truth implied by myth.  That is, to choose amongst rival theories, 
one should not look at the accuracy of the story-telling but the richness of story or the 
greatness of the heroes.  There would be no problem for a practitioner to make a context-
dependent theory choice in a clear-cut discipline like myth.  However, problem arises in 
new discipline which does not have a well-defined boundary and in the inter-disciplinary 
field.  So long as the notion of local criterion of theory choice is held, the practitioners 
have to know what are the truth-criteria of these disciplines before they could determine 
the criterion of theory choice.  However, it is unlikely that the truth-criteria of these 
disciplines could be known clearly, as in the new discipline much works on domain-
charting is awaited.  The notion of local criterion of theory choice faces no fewer 
problems in the interdisciplinary fields, for the domain of interest of these fields are not 
subsumed under a single local context/tradition.  If a theory choice is, as maintained by 
Feyerabend, local to the context/tradition, the interdisciplinary domains will render 
theory choice impossible.            
 
 
Feyerabend’s notion of local truth and local criterion of theory choice is the result of the 
non-existence of a universal rationality.  As rationality is relative, as claimed by 
Feyerabend, scientists must have abandoned the notion of universal reason.  In his book 
Farewell to Reason, Feyerabend urges that one should instead embrace relativism—a 
doctrine which has an implicit pragmatic concern in its core.  The main reason for 
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embracing relativism is for the good of human’s welfare and progress of science.  For 
relativism is open to alternatives, a virtue Feyerabend conceives as important when 
confronting the unknown possibilities in science.   
 
The way in which scientific problems are attacked and solved depends on the 
circumstances in which they arise, the (formal, experimental, ideological) means 
available at the time and the wishes of those dealing with them.  There are no 
lasting boundary conditions of scientific research. 
         (Feyerabend 2002, 304) 
 
 
In Feyerabend’s philosophy, relativism and the pluralism of theory are desirable for two 
reasons.  First, Feyerabend claims that human can never know the reality as it is; second, 
it follows that there is no definite certainty in knowledge.  It is the proliferation of theory 
that can prevent an accepted as true but indeed false theory (which is unaware by 
scientists) to dominate.  Although Feyerabend has inherited much of Wittgenstein’s 
thought, he does not resemble the latter in the least in the aspect of knowledge certainty.  
The later Wittgenstein holds that science has certain degree of certainty.  Mathematics17, 
being the pure science, has highest degree of certainty (Wittgenstein 1999, 226; 
Wittgenstein 1976, 131).  We can also have legitimate empirical claims to knowledge in 
science, argued Wittgenstein, by perceiving and observing the reality (Grayling 1996).  
However, the certainty of knowledge that is granted by Wittgenstein is denied by 
Feyerabend.   
 
Of course, ‘certain’ may not always mean ‘irrefutable’…, but whatever it means, 
‘X is certain’ cannot now make us complacent with respect to X, it cannot make us 
believe that the question concerning the truth of X is settled. 
        (Feyerabend 1981, 153) 
 
… we may point out that induction does not get us very far, and does not provide 
certainty. 
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        (Feyerabend 1995, 204) 
 
 
As a skeptic of certainty, Feyerabend embraces relativism and pluralism to “check and 
balance” the dominating theory.  Notably, relativism is not a final solution to the problem 
of certainty in science.  Proliferation of theory in science will not increase the certainty of 
knowledge.  On the contrary, it will decrease the certainty due to the absence of a 
dominating theory.  With respect to increasing knowledge certainty, Feyerabendian 
theory choice plays little, if no, role.  Regardless of whatever criterion of choice and 
whichever theory has been chosen, Feyerabend teaches us that the certainty of the 
explained reality will never be definite.  If it is so, the tenet of “anything goes” perhaps is 
the most economic but unproductive approach in theory choice.  “Anything goes” is 
economic in the sense that one does not need to literally “make” a choice, because 
Feyerabend teaches him to treat all available theories equally.  Thus, epistemic effort is 
saved for the reflection during the process of theory choice; “Anything goes” is 
unproductive in the sense that the certainty of knowledge will not be increased as a result 
of theory choice.  Since theory choice plays insignificant role in enhancing the certainty 
of knowledge, it is a meaningless endeavor in scientific practice.  One of the main 
activities of scientists is making theory choice.  If theory choice is meaningless in terms 
of increasing the certainty of knowledge, the whole scientific enterprise would be 
meaningless too.  Besides, non-sciences such as myth and magic fare no better, for theory 
choice in these enterprises can increase no certainty (e.g. certainty about the detailed 
practice of magic).  If certainty of knowledge could not be increased as a consequence of 
theory choice, the slogan of “anything goes” can hardly warrant progress in science.        
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This is also what is meant by the slogan ‘anything goes’: there is no guarantee 
that the known forms of rationality will succeed and that the known forms of 
irrationality will fail.  Any procedure, however ridiculous, may lead to progress, 
any procedure, however sound and rational, may get us stuck in the mud. 
        (Feyerabend 1977, 368) 
 
 
Notably, Feyerabend’s relativism is not a doctrine which opens the door only to 
irrationality (though Feyerabend explicitly welcomes irrationality).  Feyerabend’s 
relativism is by no means rejecting rationality.  What has been rejected is the realist 
notion of rationality, which is a universal and non-relativistic conception of rationality.  
In fact, Feyerabend’s notion of relativism still encompasses rationality as its 
component—a relativistic rationality.  The examples of this kind of rationality, as given 
by Feyerabend, are manifested in myth, magic, and traditional medicine.  For Feyerabend, 
these fields are merit in their own context.  They are rational in their respective field, for 
they can account for the reality in their respective context.  They are not universally 
rational, but relativistically rational.  The practitioners of different fields may accuse each 
other as being irrational.  Such accuse assumes a universal notion of irrationality.  
Subscribing to their contextual notion of rationality, a scientist may reject magic as an 
irrational enterprise; however, a practitioner of magic may view the practice of science 
irrational.  
 
 
By holding that rationality is relative, there would be no uniform pattern of theory choice 
in science.  As pointed out by Feyerabend, the tradition of a field matter in scientific 
development.  Since the criterion of theory choice is a part of the tradition, the relativistic 
outlook of different tradition will encompass different criterion of choice.  The rationality 
of theory choice lies in its potentiality in advancing a discipline, for Feyerabend holds 
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that proliferation of theories and methods is the key to the advancement of science.  
Hence, a rational choice should, at least, not deter or rule out rival theories, for the 
realization of the proliferation of theory.  Without ruling out other rivals, a chosen theory, 
based on Feyerabend’s criterion of rationality, should not be decisive and final.  However, 
by choosing a non-decisive theory to save other rival theories from being eliminated, one 
may risk the possibility that the best theory may not be held and sustained.  Further, a 
non-decisive theory, if being chosen, could be a disaster to the advancement of science 
due to its indeterminacy.  It is because a non-decisive theory may fall short in its 
problem-solving capability.  Hence, the principle of proliferation cannot, according to 
rationalist, serve as a rational criterion for theory choice. 
 
 
However, Feyerabend may rebut that, to save the proliferation of theory, one need not 
choose a non-decisive theory among rivals.  A decisive theory, which has the dominating 
role in persuasively accounting for a phenomenon, may still be chosen provided that it 
could warrant the proliferation of theories in science.  Feyerabend may suggest that we 
have one decisive theory as a chosen one while keeping other rival theories in 
juxtaposition as reference to “check and balance” the status quo of science.  The main 
reason Feyerabend advances the proliferation of theory is to prevent the so-called tyranny 
of a single ruling theory.  However, it is not clear how such check-and-balance 
mechanism could take place if the chosen theory is more decisive than its rivals.  For a 
check-and-balance mechanism to realize its practical power, the rival theories have to 
exert their impact (such as overriding or taking over the existing theory) on the 
dominating theory.  If a decisive theory has been chosen, there would be no rational way 
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that a check-and-balance mechanism could be exerted by the rival theories, for they are 
non-decisive.  It would be irrational to use a non-decisive theory to account for the 
observed phenomena if one has a more decisive one as his choice. 
 
 
Perhaps Feyerabend may still argue that epistemic decisiveness is not the criterion of 
theory choice.  He may contend that anything goes so long as proliferation of theory is 
warranted in science.  If it is so, scientists would be indecisive in their daily practice of 
problem-solving activity.  There would have no tangible guideline to use a theory if one 
adopts the principle of anything goes.  Major disputes amongst scientists will inevitably 
arise from time to time, for as long as the proliferation of theory is warranted, any 
decision on theory choice would appear to be rational; and follow Feyerabend’s lines of 
thought, epistemic disputes are welcomed.  There would be many solutions to a problem, 
but no scientist can decisively convince his peers if the principle of proliferation is to be 
held.  In this scenario, many solutions imply no solution.  Consequently, there would be 
no, or little, progress in science.          
 
 
Hence, it is apparent that the principle of proliferation is detrimental to the progress of 
science.  Unfortunately, Feyerabend has implicitly regarded his relativism as a rational 
approach to the advancement of science, through the proliferation of theories and 
methods.  However, this version of rational relativism is not championed by many 
scholars.  Achinstein has argued (Achinstein 2000), from a realist point of view, that 
relativism is untenable because the principle of proliferation of theory promotes the 
invention of any theory, even contradicting ones.  He asserts that there is no reason one 
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should accept all these contradicting and inconsistent theories as true or probable.  Van 
Fraassen is dubious about how one could possibly accept the coexistence of alternative 
theories without giving up one’s own (Van Fraassen 2000).  It seems to him that to accept 
a theory implies the abandonment of the alternatives.  Kekes rejects Feyerabend’s 
understanding of rationality, and criticizes Feyerabend’s relativism based on the logic-
based rationality (Kekes 1991).  Notably, these critics do not accept relativism as a 
tenable doctrine in the practice of science, nor do they accept the view that proliferation 
of theory is a rational approach to the advancement of science18. 
 
 
However, it is important not to view Feyerabend as an enemy of science, as claimed by 
Keeley, in order to understand the significance of his relativism in scientific practice 
(Keeley 2006).  Feyerabend’s slogan of “anything goes” is not all about anarchism in 
science, but also closely related to his conception of pragmatism and democracy.   
 
         
4.4.2 Relativism as Pragmatism 
 
 
Although Feyerabend does not openly profess the element of pragmatism in his 
relativism, pragmatism is the core tenet that fuels many of his important concepts.  
Pragmatism, according to Robert Brandom19, asserts that goal achievement is the primary 
virtue to be emphasized (Brandom 2005).  Feyerabend’s pragmatic idea20 lies in his stress 
on the success of science.  He claims pragmatically that anything goes for the sake of the 
proliferation of theory, that is, a mark of the success of science.  For Feyerabend, a 
scientist who subscribes to pragmatism would do science not based on truth, but based on 
the outcome.  A pragmatic scientist would choose a theory with reference to the favored 
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outcome.  If theory T can best explain an observed phenomenon which could not be 
accounted by its rival theories, it will be chosen because of its pragmatic value.  A theory 
that has been chosen is not because of its truth value.  High explanatory power of a theory, 
in the light of pragmatism, implies epistemic success (i.e. goal achieved, the phenomenon 
is satisfactorily explained, etc.).  In science, pragmatists may have different goals: theory 
to be accepted by peers, theory capable of predicting the phenomena accurately, 
constructing a simple theory, and so forth.  Goal achievement, according to pragmatist, is 
an indication of success in science.  A pragmatist will choose the right means, which may 
be more than one way, to achieve the desired success. 
 
 
Although success is the goal pursued by both realists and pragmatists, they approach it in 
different way.  A realist who subscribes to the ‘no miracle’ argument claims that the 
success of science is attributable to its approximate truth.  To pursue success in science, 
one needs to choose, at least, the approximately true theory which can mirror the reality 
as detailed as possible.  However, pragmatists dissent with this realist stance.  They assert 
that the success of science is not only brought about by the true theory at hand.  In other 
words, they believe that whatever theory it is, the one which can serve the intended 
purpose should be favored.  Pragmatists incline to maintain that there is more than one 
theory which could serve the purpose of, and promote the success in, science.   
 
 
A relativist cum pragmatist, such as Feyerabend, defines the success of science even 
more loosely.  According to Feyerabend, success of science is the proliferation of theory, 
which means the success of a multitude of theory.  He has tied the success of science to 
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the success of individual theory.  The success of a theory has two meanings in 
Feyerabend’s account: (1) being accepted widely; and (2) does not rule out the 
proliferation of rival theories.  At first it seems contradictory between these meanings.  
How could a successful theory be accepted widely and at the same time allows its rivals 
to proliferate?  The contradiction diminished as one understands that Feyerabend allows 
no single theory to dominate, that is, a doctrine of anarchism in science.  Apparently, 
Feyerabend’s principle of proliferation has a relativist flavor.  To achieve proliferation in 
science, pragmatism is the working principle.  It is this relativist pragmatism that makes 
Feyerabend a radical relativist.     
 
 
Feyerabend has made a pragmatic interpretation of the success of Galileo’s theory 
(Feyerabend 1978).  Galileo’s argument, Feyerabend claims, is not completely rational 
and unquestionable.  He points out that Galileo had made use of a large amount of 
common sense, which is irrational, in his science.  This common sense, known as 
“natural interpretations”, is “mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses, 
and which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to 
achieve.” (Feyerabend 1978, 73).  Feyerabend claims that natural interpretations, which 
are common senses, were regarded in the history of thought as irrational a priori 
presupposition of science or prejudices which were supposed to be discarded.  However, 
Feyerabend argues, Galileo’s success lies mainly in the use of natural interpretations 
which had complemented the limitation of rationalism.  The use of natural interpretations 
by Galileo was a pragmatic strategy—to render his new radical theory an outlook of 
common sense which could be more readily acceptable by the public.   
  
282 
 
Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who neither wants forever to retain natural 
interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them.  Wholesale judgements of this 
kind are quite alien to his way of thinking.  He insists upon a critical discussion to 
decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be replaced….. 
The methods of reminiscence, to which he appeals so freely, are designed to 
create the impression that nothing has changed and that we continue expressing 
our observations in old and familiar ways. 
        (Feyerabend 1978, 73) 
 
 
Feyerabend argues that Galileo’s theory appeared irrational to his contemporaries 
because it contained “absurd and counterinductive assertions, such as the assertion that 
the earth moves” (Feyerabend 1978, 81).  Of course, today we know that the assertion 
that the earth moves is true, and thus a rational claim.  However, it was not perceived as a 
true and rational claim in Galileo’s age.  What is implied by Feyerabend is that the false 
theory of the earth being static was widely conceived as true and rational during Galileo’s 
time.  The implication is that a perceived rational theory may not be a true theory.  In the 
history of science, there were many theories perceived as rational at one time turned out 
to prove false eventually.  Hence, rationality, for Feyerabend, is relative and separable 
from truth.  To make his perceived irrational theory to appear rational, Galileo adopted 
non-scientific approach such as propaganda and psychological tricks.  These approaches 
are pragmatic means for Galileo’s theory to be accepted. 
 
How does he [Galileo] manage to introduce absurd and counterinductive 
assertions, such as the assertion that the earth moves, and yet get them a just and 
attentive hearing? One anticipates that arguments will not suffice—an interesting 
and highly important limitation of rationalism—and Galileo’s utterances are 
indeed arguments in appearance only.  For Galileo uses propaganda.  He uses 
psychological tricks in addition to whatever intellectual reasons he has to offer. 
        (Feyerabend 1978, 81) 
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However, Feyerabend argues that Galileo’s theory is neither built upon realist sense of 
observation nor on other corroborated theory.  Instead, it was a result of imagination.  It 
was “a daring new suggestion involving a tremendous leap of the imagination” 
(Feyerabend 1978, 91) 
 
These [psychological] tricks are very successful: they lead him to victory.  But 
they obscure the new attitude towards experience that is in the making, and 
postpone for centuries the possibility of a reasonable philosophy.  They obscure 
the fact that the experience on which Galileo wants to base the Copernican view is 
nothing but the result of his own fertile imagination, that it has been invented. 
        (Feyerabend 1978, 81) 
 
We can now add that it leads to the invention of a new kind of experience that is 
not only more sophisticated but also far more speculative than is the experience of 
Aristotle or of common sense.  Speaking paradoxically, but not incorrectly, one 
may say that Galileo invents an experience that has metaphysical ingredients. 
       (Feyerabend 1978, 92) 
    
     
The message that Feyerabend wants to convey is that the success of Galileo’s theory does 
not merely lie in its objective reflection of the reality and accurate prediction.  Galileo’s 
theory is an imaginative creation which serves a pragmatic goal.  There are infinitely 
many scientific theories that scientist could produce imaginatively to depict the reality 
which was depicted by Galileo’s theory.  Feyerabend does not deny that there is more 
than one objective way of such depiction.  That is, according to Feyerabend, there is no 
one true theory in science.  For science to blossom, the principle of proliferation of theory, 
which is a pragmatic principle, should be endorsed. 
 
 
Feyerabend contends that the standards of practice for a discipline need not always be 
rational.  Rationality, as illustrated in the example of Galileo’s science, is a relative 
concept which differs from time to time.  Pragmatism alone constitutes a sufficient 
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standard for scientific practice.  The standard of pragmatism changes from time to time.  
Notably, Feyerabend does not think that a discipline must possess some necessary 
objective standards (such as rationality) so that it could claim for its legitimacy.  
Pragmatism as a sufficient standard will do.  The pragmatic goal of a discipline lies not in 
attaining realist truth but in acquiring wide acceptance of a multitude of theory in the 
community, which culminates in proliferation of theory and scientific progress.  
 
I grant that business, religions, special professions such as science or prostitution, 
have a right to demand that their participants and/or practitioners conform to 
standards they regard as important, and that they should be able to ascertain their 
competence…. The standards taught need not be ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ in any 
sense, though they will be usually presented as such; it suffices that they are 
accepted by the groups one wants to join, be it now Science, or Big Business, or 
The One True Religion. 
       (Feyerabend 1978, 217) 
  
 
Historical examples provided by Feyerabend convey a message that the legitimacy of a 
discipline lies in its acceptance by public.  To obtain wide acceptance for a theory, 
pragmatic means such as propaganda and psychological tricks, as used by Galileo, is 
useful.  Rationality, argued Feyerabend, is a dispensable standard for a theory to get 
accepted.  The core criterion for theory evaluation lies in the acceptability of a theory.  
That is to say, a reasonable scientist will choose a theory based on the consequences (e.g. 
the number of the followers) of such choice, not based on the causes (e.g. truth, 
coherence) that make such a choice rational.  Hence, in the presence of two rival theories, 
one needs to evaluate that which theory may potentially draw more adherents if it is 
chosen.  Scientist shall discard the theory which may not potentially draw as much 
support as its rivals.  However, this criterion for theory choice is not without problems. 
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First, acceptability as a pragmatic criterion for theory choice poses the problem of the 
criterion for itself: what constitutes a reasonable acceptance?  We may conceive of a 
radical situation where one may accept a theory blindly.  Does it constitute an acceptable 
acceptance? If the answer is positive, the accepted theory can obtain no sustaining force 
because its adherents uphold it for no reason, not even an irrational one.  He who chooses 
a theory over another for no reason may discard it easily at any point of time.  A theory 
which has been accepted blindly by the majority will be in an unstable state and in a great 
risk of being abandoned.  It does not seem rational to have one theory being chosen and 
discarded quickly due to losing support from the community.  Imagine that if the majority 
of the scientists accept a theory blindly, the high turn over rate of theory would be 
detrimental to the progress of science.  Hence, if acceptance of any theory is counted as 
an acceptable acceptance, there would be little progress in science. 
 
 
However, Feyerabend may rebut that it is not the case that any acceptance of a theory, 
blind acceptance being one example, could be counted as an acceptable acceptance.  He 
may say that an acceptable acceptance of a theory must be of reasons, regardless of 
rational or irrational ones.  That is to say: any reason goes.  However, it is a dangerous 
statement because one’s reason for the acceptance of a theory may not be relevant to the 
context.  Truth may constitute a reason for one to accept a theory; usefulness may 
constitute another reason; what if one’s reason for accepting a theory is out of context, 
such as “I accept genetic theory T because the rainbow is colorful”—which is a statement 
that does not make sense because the reason for accepting a theory is not related to the 
context of the theory.  Does an out-of-context reason constitute an acceptable acceptance?  
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If affirmative, the context to which a theory may apply is dubious, for the theory may 
appear as contextless.  The reason of one’s acceptance of a theory implies the 
applicability of that reason in the context of theory.  A theory would progress nowhere if 
it has no defined context of application.  However, if an out-of-context reason does not 
constitute an acceptable acceptance, it will be in contradiction with Feyerabend’s claim 
that any reason will do.  Thus, it is obvious that the assertion “any reason goes” fails to 
account for the acceptable acceptance of a theory. 
 
 
The second problem of acceptability as a pragmatic criterion for theory choice is an 
operational one: how could one measure and predict the degree of public acceptance of a 
theory prior to making a choice?  In Feyerabend’s account, it is vital to predict the degree 
of public acceptance of a theory because his pragmatism is outcome-based.  He argues 
that only the theory which could attract a large number of adherents should be chosen, for 
wide acceptance of a theory would promote proliferation of theory.  Notably, it is 
impossible to have a precise measurement and estimation of the degree of public 
acceptance of any theory.  Is there an objective way for an approximate measurement and 
estimation? Appealing to statistical methods perhaps is one of the ways.  However, 
Feyerabend does not stress the importance of precise or approximate estimation of the 
public acceptance of a scientific theory.  In various historical examples that Feyerabend 
has illustrated, successful scientists did not make an estimation of the degree of public 
acceptance prior to making a theory choice.  What they did is, according to Feyerabend, 
that they made a choice with the intention to have their chosen theory accepted widely by 
public.  To materialize their intention, scientists resorted to irrational alternatives such as 
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propaganda and psychological tricks.  These irrational alternatives were adopted because 
they are appealing to the public.  Feyerabend did not state clearly whether it is 
implausible for scientists to make a prediction about the degree of public acceptance of 
their theory prior to theory choice, or they were simply unwilling to do so.  However, the 
historical examples given by Feyerabend show that the degree of public acceptance for 
two rival theories could not be certain until a theory choice has been made.  If a scientist 
follows Feyerabend’s suggestion to choose a theory based on the estimated public 
acceptance, she will never be sure which theory should be chosen.  Hence, based on the 
historical examples given by Feyerabend, public acceptability as a pragmatic criterion for 
theory choice is not feasible but a mere faith.  Such a mere faith has no warranty for a 
chosen theory to succeed, for the public acceptance of a theory is dependent on various 
external factors, such as the educational level of the public, cultural background, personal 
belief and so on.   
 
 
The third problem that arises against the acceptability as a pragmatic criterion for theory 
choice is related to the second problem.  As argued above, acceptability as a pragmatic 
criterion for theory choice is a good faith.  According to Feyerabend, scientists need to 
use irrational approaches to attract adherents.  To do so, scientists have to understand the 
subjective aspects of the intended audiences.  However, Feyerabend does not show us 
how to do so.  In his writings, scientists are assumed to know how to use the right 
subjective approaches (i.e. propaganda, psychological tricks) if they are to succeed.  They 
are assumed to already have possessed the understanding of the subjective aspects of 
their intended audience.  Scientists are assumed to know what psychological approaches 
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may draw wider public acceptance for their theory; they are also assumed to know how to 
apply those approaches in order to realize the wide acceptance for their theory.  However, 
to know a psychological approach is one thing, to know how to apply it is another.  To 
know what approach to use, one needs to know the subjective aspects of the audience; to 
know how to apply an approach, one needs to master the appropriate skills (e.g. 
persuasion, deception etc).  Not to mention that the know-how requires complicated skills, 
knowing the audience is no simple task.  It seems that if a scientist adopts Feyerabend’s 
acceptability criterion for theory choice, she would have to consider the psychological 
states of her audiences, and master the publicity skills.  However, there is no certain way 
that a scientist can acquire such knowledge and apply it timely and suitably.  If 
acceptability could be a criterion for theory choice, it turns out that there is no certain 
way to achieve wide acceptance of a theory in scientific community.      
 
                
In short, it is apparent that the outcome of a theory choice—degree of acceptance of a 
theory in the scientific community—fails to serve as a pragmatic criterion for theory 
choice.  Feyerabend has no way to show that a theory choice could be made based on the 
predicted degree of acceptance in scientific community. 
 
 
However, Feyerabend may still recourse to his slogan of “anything goes” to defend his 
principle of proliferation.  He may argue that theory acceptability in a community is not 
the only condition to warrant the proliferation of theory, indeed any theory choice would 
do.  This line of argument is a transformation of “anything goes” to “any choice goes”.  
Now the question is: would this argument serve a pragmatic end—scientific progress?  
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For Feyerabend, proliferation of theory is equivalent to scientific progress.  That is, 
scientific progress is measured by the quantity of the accepted theory.  In this sense, the 
“any choice goes” argument would result in the increase of accepted theory.     
 
 
Notably, the emphasis of Feyerabend on the quantity of the accepted theory would render 
him to embrace not “any choice” but “all choice” when a scientist is presented with a 
range of rival theories.  For the “any choice goes” argument suggests that one can make 
any (one) choice among the rival theories, but for the sake of the proliferation of theory, 
one should choose all the rival theories instead of only one.  So, Feyerabend’s slogan of 
“anything goes”, which says that all theories are on the same epistemic par, would lead to 
the conclusion that all theories should be accepted, when associated with the principle of 
proliferation.  To have a maximum quantity of theory to proliferate, it is not good enough 
for one to choose any (one) theory, but he is obliged to choose all rival theories (albeit the 
contradictory ones).  So, to adhere to the principle of proliferation, Feyerabend has to 
embrace “all choice goes”.  However, choosing all rival theories implies no choice at all, 
for a choice constitutes two components: inclusion and exclusion.  The “all choice goes” 
argument assumes no exclusion of theory.  All theories are on the same epistemic par and 
equally merit to be chosen.  In that case, scientific progress will be just a mere 
accumulation of theory and it is directionless, for choosing a theory implies choosing a 
direction.  When all rival theories are embraced, such proliferation of theory is inevitably 
directionless.  Using Kuhn’s term, there would have no paradigm.  Perhaps Feyerabend is 
not bothered by the directionless of science in his principle of proliferation, as he has 
explicitly against the domination, which implies a direction, of a single theory in science.       
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4.4.3  Democracy and Relativism 
 
 
Feyerabend’s relativism in philosophy of science has been extended to his political 
thought in which he comes to embrace a notion of “free society”.  Free society, according 
to Feyerabend, “is a society in which all traditions should be given equal rights no matter 
what other traditions think about them” (Feyerabend 1995a, 75).  It is a liberal society 
where democracy prevails and everyone has a right to choose his favorite tradition or 
theory, regardless it is scientific or non-scientific, rational or irrational.   
 
 
Notably, Feyerabend asserts that the prevalence of science is a threat to democracy 
because the equality of traditions is destroyed (Feyerabend 1978a).  Individual citizen has 
deprived of their right to choose the tradition which is other than science.  In a society 
where science prevails, non-scientific traditions are viewed as irrational and should be 
discarded.  It is thus not a free society because science is the only arrangement for all 
citizens.  Science is enforced on all citizens without seeking their approval.     
 
We accept scientific laws and scientific facts, we teach them in our schools, we 
make them the basis of important political decisions, but without ever having 
subjected them to a vote…. Modern society is “Copernican’ not because 
Copernicanism has been put on a ballot, subjected to a democratic debate and then 
voted in with a simple majority; it is ‘Copernican’ because the scientists are 
Copernicans and because one accepts their cosmology as uncritically as one once 
accepted the cosmology of bishops and cardinals. 
        (Feyerabend 1978, 301-302) 
 
 
As a democratic relativist, Feyerabend against the view that science should be favored 
due to its enormous success.  In view of the fact that “science is not always successful” 
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(Feyerabend 1978, 306), Feyerabend insists that everyone has a right to reject science in a 
free society.  Of course, it does not mean that individual is encouraged to embrace non-
science rather than science.  Rather, the main point is that individuals should be given the 
right to do so if they seem fit.  For example, a patient should have the right to choose 
traditional medicine over modern medical treatment, an act which should not be deemed 
irrational.  Any attempt to hold that only science is rational is a dangerous move, for it 
may lead to the abandonment of culture (as the customs, life styles, religions, etc cannot 
be rationalized in the ways the sciences do). 
 
 
Feyerabend has distinguished between the rights of citizens and the consequences of 
exercising these rights (Feyerabend 1978a, 86).  Though Feyerabend does not explicitly 
admit Lockean natural rights into his thought, he states that rights should be given to 
citizens for two reasons.  The first reason is that “everyone must be able to pursue what 
he thinks is truth, or the correct procedure” (Feyerabend 1978a, 86).  The second reason 
is related to his principle of proliferation: “because the only way of arriving at a useful 
judgement of what is supposed to be the truth, or the correct procedure is to become 
acquainted with the widest possible range of alternatives.” (Feyerabend 1978a, 86).  
 
 
The first reason of conferring the rights to citizens is fairly compatible with the notion of 
liberal society.  A liberal society grants individual rights to think, say, and act, with a 
proviso that the granted freedom is not in violation with others’ well-being.  It is this 
proviso that is missing in Feyerabend’s thought.  The proviso of rights is always taking 
the form of laws in a liberal society.  A law legitimately commands obedience (Held 
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2006), with no exception.  However, Feyerabend does not set a boundary for the citizens’ 
rights to operate.  He has not considered the scenarios where the rights of citizen might 
be in conflict with ethics, laws and public welfare.  Consider one of such scenarios: 
 
A man who was badly injured in a car accident expressed his will that he prefers 
traditional medical treatment to modern medical treatment.  If he is not treated by 
modern medicine immediately, he will possibly die.  The dilemma now is: should 
individual rights be emphasized over the ethical concern? 
 
     
For Feyerabend, the rights of the injured man in the scenario above should be respected.  
Nobody should force him into receiving modern medical treatment.  Feyerabend would 
have argued that the consequence of exercising this right should be taken separately.  He 
holds that the consequence of exercising a right should not deny and override the right 
itself.  That is, the consequence should not affect a decision of choice (e.g. science/non-
science).  In the scenario above, Feyerabend would have said that one should not force 
the injured man to receive modern medical treatment although he would probably die by 
insisting on traditional medicine. 
 
Scientists, of course, assume that there is nothing better than science.  The citizens 
of a democracy cannot rest content with such a pious faith.  Participation of 
laymen in fundamental decisions is therefore required even if it should lower the 
success rate of the decisions. 
          (Feyerabend 1978a, 87) 
 
 
Citizens’ rights without proviso are extended to the making of scientific decision and 
policy.  Feyerabend stresses that citizens’ decision should be taken into consideration in 
science and education of science. 
 
Assuming this right, a citizen has a say in the running of any institution to which 
he makes a financial contribution, either privately, or as a taxpayer: state colleges, 
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state universities, tax supported research institutions such as the National Science 
Foundation are subjected to the judgement of taxpayers, and so is every local 
elementary school.  If the taxpayers of California want their state universities to 
teach Voodoo, folk medicine, astrology, rain dance ceremonies, then this is what 
the universities will have to teach. 
        (Feyerabend 1978a, 86-87) 
 
Duly elected committees of laymen must examine whether the theory of evolution 
is really as well established as biologists want us to believe…. They must 
examine whether scientific medicine deserves the unique position of theoretical 
authority….. In all cases the last word will not be that of the experts, but that of 
the people immediately concerned. 
        (Feyerabend 1978a, 96-97) 
 
 
Apparently, Feyerabend suggests that science should be supervised by laymen in order to 
protect their rights and benefits.  Furthermore, Feyerabend believes that laymen can spot 
the errors of specialists (Feyerabend 1978a, 97).  Conceivably, Feyerabend would have 
suggested that theory choice of scientist should be subjected to public’s supervision too, 
because there are theories, such as Darwin’s theory of evolution, which are contradictory 
to individual’s belief.  When a layman has a say in scientific theory choice, which is 
deemed legitimate regardless of whether it is rational or irrational, the decision made by 
scientist would be governed largely by non-scientific factors.  The choice of a theory over 
its rivals would be relative to the contemporary public’s opinion.  Scientist would incline 
to be a social pragmatist, rather than being a scientific pragmatist, in arbitrating between 
rival theories.  It is highly improbable that a choice would be based on scientific 
consideration when laymen have a role to play in making a theory choice. 
 
 
If that is the case, theory choice is no longer a scientific issue but a socio-political one.  
Even if a scientist would seriously take scientific factors into consideration, he still has to 
put the public’s opinion at the forefront.  Following Feyerabend’s line of thought, a free 
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society would have its citizens exerting fully their rights and opinions, overriding that of 
scientists, on scientific activities.  Scientists are deemed to work for the citizens by 
adhering to their opinion and decision.  Scientist would then assume a role more as a 
“socio-political scientist” than a professional scientist.   
 
 
Thus, theory choice in a free society has no scientific base because it is arbitrary.  
According to Feyerabend, however, it is favorable because it would promote proliferation 
of theory, and consequently scientific progress.  Feyerabend is right to say that theory 
will proliferate, but he is wrong to think that it leads to progress in science.  The reason is 
simple: if there is a progress in any sense, it is not of science; because theory choice and 
other scientific activities are dominated by laymen’s opinions which are not scientific.  
Although in a Feyerabendian free society everyone is granted equal rights to science and 
non-science, the progress of science would inevitably be deprived due to the domination 
of laymen’s opinion. 
 
 
Feyerabend may rebut that the participation of laymen in theory choice is beneficial in 
two senses: (1) it will ensure that no false theory can dominate and overrule the true 
rivals, in the case where a scientist has made a wrong choice; (2) it will ensure the 
progress of society.  The first rebuttal assumes that human is fallible, including scientists.  
However, this rebuttal does not consider the fact that laymen are more likely to err than a 
well-trained scientist with regard to scientific matters.  Laymen, with their own interests 
and beliefs, will not do justice to science.  Assuming that they have good will to treat 
science fairly, they are not capable of doing so because they do not possess the required 
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knowledge and skills.  Hence, laymen’s participation in theory choice is a disaster to 
science rather than saving science from domination by false theory.  The second rebuttal 
assumes that progress of society is more important than of science.  Though Feyerabend 
does not say that progress of science is unimportant, his thought has implicitly excluded 
the parallel progression of science and society.  For science to progress, Feyerabend 
requires proliferation of theory.  However, proliferation of theory does not increase the 
likelihood of the accumulation of true theory, which in turn does not drive science to 
progress.  However, theory proliferation (i.e. prevalence of both scientific and non-
scientific theories) may drive society to progress in a limited sense: the society becomes 
more liberal where everyone’s rights are respected and realized.  The society, as a whole, 
is unlikely to progress in terms of scientific advancement, for scientific progress is 
inconceivable in Feyerabendian free society.  Feyerabend has overlooked the fact that the 
progress of the modern society is always achieved via the techno-scientific advancement.  
Progress in society in terms of the promotion of citizen’s right without a simultaneous 
progress in science can hardly be justified as a real progress, at least in the modern sense.  
Hence, it is apparent that Feyerabendian free society is a free but unprogressive society.  
It can be concluded that participation of laymen in theory choice and other scientific 
activities is democratic but unfruitful.    
 
 
4.5  Conclusion     
 
 
This chapter explores three well-known relativists’ philosophy and their stances on the 
thesis of theory choice.  Although they belong to the same camp, their relativism differs 
in kind.  Nelson Goodman and Thomas Kuhn are mild relativists who do not go against 
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the rationality of science, whereas Feyerabend is a radical relativist who promotes the 
prevalence of irrationality and suggests that rationality should not have a dominating 
position in science.  However, three of them share a common stance in anti-
foundationalism, claiming that science should not be reduced to a single universal theory 
or law.  They hold that a foundationalist view of science is detrimental to the progress of 
science.   
 
 
Goodman has developed a pluralist theory of world-versions.  It is a contextualist theory 
which asserts that there exist multiple right world-versions.  World-versions are the 
perspectives through which one constructs her world.  Hence, world-versions make 
plausible the interpretation or perception of the world in which one resides.  Goodman 
denies the idea that there is only a single world.  Indeed, there are multiple worlds which 
are distinct and equally real.  Goodman holds that world-versions are different ways of 
interpreting the worlds, which could not be reduced to only one.  World-version consists 
of not merely subjective elements; it is also objectively based in the sense that one cannot 
construct a world-version in an arbitrary way.  The subjective elements of a world-
version are referred as style, which represents the subjective lens to interpreting the 
objective world.  Different styles in doing science would result in different interpretations 
of a phenomenon and a theory.   
 
 
According to Goodman’s principle of world-versions, scientific theories could be 
interpreted in more than one way, dependent on which world-versions one is holding.  
There would be no definite way to arbitrate between rival theories.  Different scientists 
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have different world-versions that would inevitably lead to different judgments on the 
candidate theories.  Notably, Goodman does not suggest that the disagreement among 
scientists on theory choice could be settled by reference to the reality, for there is no 
ultimate mind-independent reality.  Goodman has used a famous example to illustrate this 
idea.  The assertions that “the earth moves” and “the earth stands still” are both true in 
different worlds yet incompatible, argued Goodman.  The truth value of the assertions is 
dependent on one’s perspective.  The non-existence of a single ultimate reality renders 
theory choice indefinite, in the realist sense that as if there could have only one correct 
choice corresponding to a single world.  However, theory choice is definite in the 
pluralist sense that there could have one correct choice relative to each of the world-
versions.  In Goodman’s philosophy, theory choice is relative to the pluralistic reality.  
The recognition of a pluralistic reality is termed as “plurealism” by Scheffler (Scheffler 
2000 & Scheffler 2001), which is an approach upheld by Goodman in his theory of 
world-versions.  
 
 
As a relativist, Goodman subscribes to the notion of the proliferation of world-version.  
He holds that “conflicting versions often present good and equal claims to truth” 
(Goodman 1978, 110).  However, the proliferation of world-version is different from 
Feyerabend’s proliferation of theory in terms of motive.  For Goodman, proliferation of 
world-version is a natural corollary of science, as different scientists have different styles 
and perspectives in doing science.  For Feyerabend, proliferation of theory is an unnatural 
objective, which should be strived for in order to prevent the tyranny of a single 
dominating theory.  Hence, theory choice in Goodman’s account is world-version 
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relevant, which could be rationally justified.  However, theory choice can hardly be 
rationally justified in Feyerabend’s account because a scientist may choose any theory to 
counteract the dominance of a true theory.    
 
 
Goodman’s pluralistic notion of world-version invites the problem of theory choice 
which has also been faced by realist.  Though Goodman has rejected a fundamentalist 
notion of reality, he is by no means an anti-realist.  In fact, he can be characterized as a 
pluralistic realist—perhaps can be called “plurealist”, using Scheffler’s term.  He admits 
that all world-versions are equally true, which are corresponding to diverse realities that 
underlie beneath.  According to Goodman, there is no absolute truth across the realities.  
Indeed, what a scientist can pursue is the truth which is relative to each world-version.  
The problem of theory choice that haunts realist thus comes into this way to Goodman’s 
philosophy: how could the indeterminate observed data determine the theory in each 
world-version?  Crucial experiment is impossible to decisively arbitrate between rival 
theories in each world-version, because theory is underdetermined by evidence.  
Scientists are unable to choose decisively among rival theories which entail identical 
observational consequences.  We may assume that Goodman would have suggested that 
by altering the auxiliary hypotheses the scientists may obtain non-identical observed 
phenomena.  However, Pitts has shown that the empirical equivalence of theories 
remained stable under the change of auxiliary hypotheses (Pitts 2011).  Obviously, 
Goodman’s plurealist account cannot solve the problem of theory choice because theory 
in each world-version is assumed to correspond to the world-version constrained reality. 
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Goodman could have avoided the problem of theory choice if he is a modal realist 
advocating the notion of possible worlds.  Unfortunately, he asserts that all worlds are 
parallel-running actual worlds.  A modal realist may at the same time be a relativist.  He 
may say that notwithstanding the fact that theory is underdetermined by data in the actual 
world, there are possible worlds where observed phenomena are determinate to arbitrate 
among rival theories.  The observed phenomena are, a modal realist may argue, distinct 
in different possible worlds.  Alternatively, a modal realist may state that the empirically 
equivalent rival theories can co-exist in distinct possible worlds, while the theory choice 
is made in an actual world.  Hence, a modal realist may conclude that theory choice is 
always in principle possible.  If Goodman were a modal realist, he will not face the 
problem of theory choice in his account of world-versions. 
 
 
This chapter has elaborated Kuhn’s relativism at length due to its significant and lasting 
influence in the post-positivist philosophy of science.  Kuhn’s philosophy has received 
much attention and criticism partly due to the novelty of its notions (e.g. paradigm, 
normal science), and partly due to the ambiguity of his writings.  Notably, Kuhn does not 
perceive himself a relativist.  He has publicly repudiated the label of irrationalist which 
was conferred upon him. 
 
 
Kuhn has not professed irrationalism in his thought.  Nonetheless, the implication of his 
philosophy, which was widely read as typical relativism, is often associated by his critics 
to irrationalism.  On the contrary, Kuhn claims that rationality is an indispensable feature 
of mature science.  On his account, rationality is always presupposed in scientific activity.  
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The criteria of theory choice (e.g. accuracy, coherence, etc) are rational, according to 
Kuhn.  Scientists can and must use a rational criterion to arbitrate between rival theories.  
Unfortunately, the problem that Kuhn faces is that he fails to account for the prevalence 
of the irrational factors in the process of theory choice.  Although a scientist may make a 
choice among rival theories with rational criteria, his choice is inevitably influenced by 
irrational factors such as his academic background, personal belief, and peers’ opinion.  
The close association between socio-psychological factors and scientific practices that 
has been propounded by Kuhn contributes to the irrationality of theory choice, as accused 
by scientific realists and antirealists.  Hence, they claim that theory choice is to some 
extent arbitrary in Kuhn’s philosophy.  Apparently, Kuhn rejects such accusation by 
holding that his criteria of theory choice are rational and independent from the process of 
making a theory choice.  Kuhn attempts to justify that his criteria of theory choice are 
normative and independent from the historical context, while the socio-psychological 
factors that shape an actual decision on a particular theory are contingent and descriptive.  
Therefore, he stresses that his normative criteria of theory choice is rational and 
independent from the irrational contingent socio-psychological factors.    
 
 
The notion of paradigm, which represents one of the most important notions in Kuhn’s 
philosophy, fares no better to get rid of relativism.  In fact, it is unclear how a rational 
replacement of paradigms is possible.  According to Kuhn’s narration, the nature of 
paradigm is socio-psychological rather than scientific.  Paradigm represents a communal 
consensus held by the scientists who are working within the same tradition.  Consensus 
can be achieved via persuasion, training, textbooks, communal values and the pressure 
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from peers.  The adherents of a paradigm do not always choose to uphold it because of 
the scientific reason; they may choose to believe and practice in a paradigm merely 
because they are taught that it is a true paradigm.   
 
 
Further, shift from one paradigm to another exposes the problem of incommensurability 
according to which Kuhn has not satisfactorily accounted for the translation failure and 
referential discontinuity.  According to the incommensurability of paradigms, there are 
no shared empirical consequences between rival theories because scientific terms cannot 
be translated point-by-point into a neutral language.  As a consequence, theory choice 
inevitably lacks a rational ground. 
 
 
Feyerabend holds a pluralist view of scientific theory.  He has criticized the 
foundationalism and the rationalism as the tyranny of science.  He holds that there should 
not be a single theory which dominates by ruling out its rivals.  According to Feyerabend, 
the domination of a single theory prevents the growth of other better theories.  Contrary 
to scientific realist’s correspondence principle, Feyerabend’s principle of proliferation 
asserts that any theory, regardless of whether it is true or false, should have equal chance 
to prevail.   
 
 
There are no rational criteria for theory choice in Feyerabend’s relativism.  The principle 
of the proliferation of theory promotes “anything goes” in science.  Strictly speaking, any 
theory could be chosen using any standard.  For Feyerabend, it is not a matter of right or 
wrong.  The objective of theory choice is to serve the proliferation of theory.  Since 
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Feyerabend holds that all theory, being true or false, should have the chance to proliferate, 
theory choice is thus an irrational activity.  According to the principle of anything goes, 
any choice goes. 
 
 
In short, this chapter has demonstrated that Feyerabend has totally dismissed the thesis of 
theory choice by his radical relativism, whereas Goodman and Kuhn strive to maintain a 
rational outlook of their thought on theory choice.  Although Goodman and Kuhn have 
stressed that they are taking a rational stance, their relativism has somehow rendered 
them an irrationalist image.  It is largely because the criteria of theory choice proposed by 
Goodman and Kuhn are relative to world-versions and paradigms, respectively.     
 
